

Marine Corps Gazette

MARCH 1944

THIRTEEN



TK ORINGS

Marine Corps Gazette

MARCH 1954
NUMBER 3
VOLUME 38

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COVER



The first sketch showed a Marine dressed in combat gear sitting on a rock and orienting his compass. Purists screamed, so Corporal Tony Kokinos went back to his easel, took off the helmet and laid it down next to the rifle. The grenade, hooked onto the patrol leader's vest, came up for pointed remarks next, so we experimented. Tests showed that it wouldn't affect the accuracy of the compass. The grenade stayed where it was. Then, just before he left to plot an azimuth from the separation center back to a billet in civil life, artist Kokinos painted in the rip on the Marine's sleeve. "There," he muttered, "let 'em argue about *that* affecting the compass." Back cover: The new XHR2S Sikorsky helicopter.

PUBLISHED BY THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION

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Opinions expressed in the Gazette do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps

message center

Re-enlistment Outlook

DEAR SIR:

I am anxious to be numbered among those who join in applause of Master Sergeant Morgan's objective essay, *The Outlook*, in your January issue. It is a clear, understandable and thought-provoking piece—but most of all it is useful in that it offers solutions to a number of our most pressing personnel problems. I am in agreement with Morgan in essentially all that he says, but would like to add one thought to his excellent presentation. It has to do with the part which command authority plays in creating—and in solving—these problems.

It is my belief that the dignity of the NCO is diminished in no small degree by a trend toward complexity in organization, and the assumption of command authority by a vast assortment of staff personnel who truly have no authority in their own right. Emphasis upon the old straight-line arrangement, wherein each commander at whatever level demands precise performance from his next sub-

specialist personnel, as actually being responsible for the quality of food, is deadly. It may be the concern of many, but it is the responsibility only of the commander.

The matter of re-enlistment falls in the same pattern, just as Morgan indicates. It is the responsibility of the squad leader, the section leader, the platoon sergeant, etc. to make the real, effective re-enlistment effort with respect to the men in his charge. No special mechanism set up outside the line of command authority is now, or ever can be, effective.

Finally, I would commend to you the thought that the introductory sentence used by Morgan in his next to last paragraph is good enough for preservation and for quotation as an element of the basic philosophy of the Corps—

"Pride is still our pivot, and fundamentals are our problems."

G. C. THOMAS
LtGen, USMC
Assistant Commandant

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR:

I am starting my fifth year of marriage to a Marine . . . we like the Corps and my husband shipped over for six . . . but we feel a few changes could be made. . . .

Bring back the old Boot Camp, instill pride in the men and train them to be men instead of boys. . . . Bring back the old brig—the one that gave men hard work, not vacations. . . .

Our Marines are the backbone of the nation . . . our Boot Camp is the backbone of the Corps. Discipline is there for a purpose—let's keep it that way!

LOIS A. CHRISTIAN

Santa Ana, Calif.

DEAR SIR:

. . . a greater effort is needed, from the top down, to enforce discipline and give troops stronger leadership—pride in a military unit is often a

good substitute for big pay in a blanket factory. . . .

ROBERT LEVY
MSGT, USMC

San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR SIR:

. . . What's the solution? I suggest a more extensive warrant officer program. . . .

THOMAS F. KORNER
MSGT, USMC

Newark, N. J.

"Of Mortars and Men"

DEAR SIR:

Congratulations on the selection of LtCol Wade's article on mortars as the GAZETTE's prize-winning essay. It is truly one of the finest pieces of writing the GAZETTE has published.



Never, until this month, did I ever suspect that the staid old GAZETTE had a sense of humor.

I certainly enjoyed the author's subtle humor. I can imagine him now, tongue in cheek, anxiously awaiting some unwary soul who really took him seriously and intends to loudly challenge waggish assertions. The skill with which he has baited this trap for the unsuspecting is superlative. His subtle casuistry shows the fine hand of a delicate wit masquerading behind a well-camouflaged veil of heavy-handed seriousness, needling the poor old mortarman's "maudlin" affection for his weapon. It takes more than a casual glance to see that the colonel's words are really in jest. Come now—you didn't really think that you would fool many Marines who thoroughly know their business. We know you are only kidding.

The serious GAZETTE was fine, but



ordinate, will go far toward re-establishing the NCO in the posture which we all desire.


With respect to food, I have only to say this—the command situation, which I have just discussed, applies squarely to the mess line. It is a commander's responsibility to ensure that his unit is properly fed. The growing tendency to look upon



BIGGER PUNCH—Two squads of hard-hitting Marines—26 men with full battle equipment—charge out of this new Sikorsky helicopter's wide-open nose door in a

demonstration of airborne assault techniques. The huge XHR2S was designed especially to meet the Marine Corps' need for a big, fast, highly maneuverable helicopter.

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shell doors and built-in ramp permit rapid loading and unloading. The helicopter compares in size to a twin-engined airliner. A commercial model, the S-56, will be built later.



BUILT FOR BATTLE—Sikorsky Aircraft's rugged XHR2S, the most powerful helicopter now flying, was designed to carry out modern vertical assault tactics. It has flown with over 6,500 pounds of payload, and at speeds well over 150 m.p.h. with landing gear retracted into engine pods. Five-bladed main rotor and the tail both fold mechanically for easy stowage and handling aboard ship.



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the humorous GAZETTE is much better. Let's have some more.

PATRICK C. ROE
Capt, USMC

Quantico, Va.

ED: *Speaking of "baiting traps," you're no mean woodsman yourself!*

DEAR SIR:

... When mortars are no longer useful they will be cut from our family of infantry weapons as "un-sentimentally" as the .30 caliber carbine. ... The conclusion that "the older the weapon, the greater is the inertia of sentimental regard in which it basks" is faulty. ... Let's face facts—the artillery has limitations too! ...

HERMAN NICKERSON, JR.
Colonel, USMC

Quantico, Va.

DEAR SIR:

... Granted, the howitzer is the most effective and economical support weapon. However, it cannot reach all conceivable mortar targets when safety of troops is concerned. A study of trajectory diagrams is not conclusive. Experience has proven that high-angle or conventional VT howitzer support cannot safely be fired within 25-50 yards of troops. Mortars (in particular the 4.2) can...

The rifled 4.2-inch mortar has surpassed artillery in accuracy, safety and freedom from short rounds and muzzle bursts. We need lighter, rifled mortars but we cannot replace them.

F. R. HITTINGER, JR.
Capt, USMC

Atlanta, Ga.

DEAR SIR:

... A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush—or a mortar that you are firing is worth a regiment of mortars and artillery that you could fire.

... LtCol Wade seems to dismiss a main advantage [ease of control] of the light mortars. Infantrymen won't want to dismiss it as lightly.

HERBERT M. HART
1stLt, USMC

USS Randolph (CVA-15)

DEAR SIR:

... The low cost and ease of production of mortars may be a decisive factor in a major war.

Mobility is synonymous with an amphibious force. Mortars provide mobile support from the time the first infantry company is ashore. ...

Compare the explosive charge of divisional artillery with that of a regimental mortar shell. The mortar charge is considerably larger.

Let's not be too hasty. Possibly it is us, not the mortar, who are to blame. We have lagged far behind the Soviets in mortar research. ... Possibly we need new fire-control concepts, but please—don't deep-six the mortar.

RUSSELL S. HIBBS
Capt, USMC

Norfolk, Va.

Each month the GAZETTE pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the GAZETTE requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.

DEAR SIR:

... There is no doubt in my mind that many of the men who read *Of Mortars and Men* would not have been alive to read it if they had been fighting without their mortars.

JOHN G. WORD
1stLt, USMC

Quantico, Va.

DEAR SIR:

... LtCol Wade suggests that infantry commanders be relieved of their "mortar burdens." ... As he predicts, we "sentimentalists" rally 'round the base plate.

... None of the colonel's criticisms justify the abandonment of the mortars. They do, however, provide a framework for an evaluation of the mortar's capabilities projected

against requirements we should anticipate in future operations.

JOSEPH R. OWEN
1stLt, USMC (Ret'd)

Schenectady, N. Y.

DEAR SIR:

... the author drags out a shop-worn but popular fallacy, the laying to rest of which is long overdue. He claims "Sentiment played a most important role in the uncertain transition to the M1 rifle (from the '03) at the outset of World War II." Since the Marine Corps sets great store by tradition and sentiment, he has mistakenly supposed that we let sentiment stand in the way of economy, efficiency or improvement. This misconception couldn't be farther from the truth. ...

There was no more doubt in the minds of the users about the efficacy of the M1 than there was in the minds of the testers. Marine riflemen made so many midnight requisitions for M1s on adjacent Army units on Guadalcanal that corrective orders were issued; and units periodically had shake-downs and collected and turned in all M1s. In spite of these measures some units left the island almost completely equipped with the M1. Needless to state, both divisions were re-equipped as soon as a legitimate supply of M1s became available.

F. B. NIHART
LtCol, USMC

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR:

... his accusation that "maudlin sentiment" for the Springfield caused the Marine Corps to vacillate in the adoption of the M1 is inaccurate. For the record, Marines should know that this particular shoe does not fit. ...

STANLEY W. TRACHTA
Colonel, USMC

Norfolk, Va.

ED: *Whew!*

Training Tune-up

DEAR SIR:

In Colonel Prickett's article, *Tune-Up For Training*, he states attempting to train an infantry battalion by company organization will produce one of two things—jacks of all trades and masters of none, or mas-

2000 miles out —only 1/100th second back!



SHE'S far from port, this ship—but the captain is as well informed as if he were sailing into San Francisco Bay.

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ters of one trade and recruits at all the others.

It is this writer's opinion that the colonel has hit at the core of most training problems, not only for Marines in infantry battalions but in all FMF units. In fact, this applies even more to AAA and service units since they have a more complex organization than do Weapons or H&S companies. All Marines should be trained by the half-day.

More articles of this nature would be of a decided help in preparing training schedules.

IRVIN R. STONE
TSgt, USMC

29 Palms, Calif.

Chin Strap

DEAR SIR:

... I agree with Sergeant Phillip Tsotsos and Corporal Vlad Tremi. ... I say that the present chin strap is not only unsatisfactory, it is also unsafe. ...

JOHN G. MOORE
Sergeant, USMC

Santa Ana, Calif.

DEAR SIR:

Message Center for January 1954,

carried a letter from Sergeant Tsotsos and Corporal Tremi regarding modification of the present helmet chin strap. On 7 January 1953, I wrote the MCEB regarding the same item, and I quote the reply received:

"The chin strap, helmet, steel, M1, Stock No. 74-S-366-11 is a replaceable chin strap similar in construction to the clamp type described. All helmets procured since the later stages of World War II have been provided with this type of chin strap. As the earlier, nondetachable type of chin straps become worn out, they are replaced with the removable type."

Considering the vast number of helmets purchased during World War II that are still serviceable, it will undoubtedly be some time before we all benefit from the modification listed above.

EDWARD S. BAKER, JR.
Captain, USMC
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Teaching in Korean

DEAR SIR:

I was extremely interested in Major Carrington's article *Language No*

Barrier, as I was in charge of training a KMC tank platoon and a cadre for a KMC tank company in Korea.

We found that the best instruction were the "demonstration" and the "coach and pupil" methods. The lecture was most unsatisfactory. Keeping the students in small groups, when possible, increased the efficiency of instruction; and assigning an instructor the same interpreter for every class diminished the time lost for rehearsals required between instructor and interpreter.

A simple answer was found to the problem of finding a suitable translation for any word that had no equivalent in the Korean language, and that was for the Koreans to learn and use the American word. For example, the technical word "wedge" of a tank became "wedgie" to the Koreans, and this proved very satisfactory.

N. CAPPELLETO
Captain, USMC

Denver, Colo.

And in this Corner: the Jacket

Dear Sir:

I am one of many Marines who are at a loss to understand the order that banned the green jacket in favor of the old-fashioned blouse.

Was it for the sake of appearance? Ask any group of Marines at any post or station which they prefer on the basis of looks. . . . Was it for economy? Obviously, with more material and needlework, the blouse is more expensive than the jacket. Isn't economy an important word in Washington these days?

Was it because of ease in fitting? A QM sergeant will verify the fact that it is easier to fit men with jackets than with blouses. Furthermore, tailoring for a sharp fit is relatively easy and inexpensive. On the other hand, due to its cut and its belt arrangement, the blouse will fit a man properly only if his waist is right in relation to the rest of his body. A high-waisted man or a low-waisted one has a real and expensive problem of tailoring ahead of him with the blouse.

Was it because of simplicity in traveling? The jacket can take it when folded in a suitcase or even a sea bag; the blouse has to be babied, else it will wrinkle badly.

Of course, the blouse is "old Marine Corps," but is it such a vital

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
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tradition that it must be upheld in spite of appearance, choice of the men, economy, fit and wrinkles?

J. W. PATTERSON
Major, USMCR

San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR SIR:

... Concerning the uniform worn by Marines, I believe that the Marine Corps should allow both the blouse and the jacket to be worn. ... Not every Marine looks sharp in the blouse and, on the other hand, not everyone looks sharp in the jacket.

I do think that the Marine Corps should have one style of trousers—that being with two hip pockets, a watch pocket and no side pockets. ...

... The summer uniform should be made of a better material and I also believe that this uniform should be dyed a Marine green, and the use of a red stripe and gold emblem put into effect with this green summer uniform.

To me, and many others, built-up shoes should be made uniform and regulation throughout the Marine Corps. They keep a shine longer, look sharper and wear longer.

FRANK J. SCHLAGETTER
Pfc, USMC

San Diego, Calif.

Packs, Straws and Camels

DEAR SIR:

It was with interest that I read Captain Ludwig's solution of the pack problem. The comments that followed, including that of 1stLt Erlandsen of the Norwegian Home Guards, provided very informative and constructive ideas for bearing the burden, particularly in cold-weather operations. Our endeavors ... during such operations have resulted in ... bulky and weighty packs that fatigue, decrease mobility and hamper effectiveness. ...

Efforts to improve ... the pack ... are commendatory and necessary. However, the direction of effort seems somewhat misplaced. Emphasis should be on lightening of the load now carried and decreasing its bulk. It is the addition of little straws that finally breaks the camel's back. ...

W. F. FRANK
LtCol, USMC

Washington, D. C.

"Outpost" Accolade

DEAR SIR:

Outpost Warfare by 1stLt Peter Braestrup, which appeared in the November 1953 GAZETTE, is a gem of an article. It is unusual in that it combines the presentation of an important tactical concept with good writing. As a rifle platoon leader in several assault landings in World War II, I appreciated the author's clear description of outpost warfare at the company level and, as an armchair major, I enjoyed the chance to find out about a type of warfare unknown to me and the Marine Corps in World War II.

Furthermore, I should like to congratulate the editors on a splendid job. I feel that the GAZETTE is a high-type journal.

ARMCHAIR MAJOR

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Red Tape . . . Everywhere!

DEAR SIR:

I am rather puzzled by the current policy in force concerning Marine Corps savings. Years ago an account was opened merely by allotting a portion of your monthly pay, which amount was automatically credited to you at Marine Corp Savings. Psychologically, that was fine—you never saw the money, oftentimes never missed it.

Currently, I find an involved system used. A man draws his pay, goes to the disbursing office, fills out a form and, if all is happily in order, he is credited with the monthly deposit. Why all this, when the old system was obviously quite efficient?

FRANCIS J. O'NEIL

MSgt, USMC

c/o FPO, San Francisco

Boot Camp Memories

DEAR SIR:

I would like to ask for a true story of boot camp at Parris Island. ... I haven't seen one yet. ... I don't think there's a Marine alive that wouldn't like to have the story of his boot camp life to show his grandchildren. ...

ROBERT G. FRIAR

Effingham, S. C.

ED: *The GAZETTE Bookshop has several excellent books that cover the field. Either Gilbert Bailey's Boot or Packwood's Leatherhead in Boot Camp should serve.*

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our authors

☛ **CWO Kenneth Gilman** (*When The Roads Give Out*) has worked with horses and animals most of his life. A graduate of the Vocational Agricultural School in Essex, Mass., the gunner also holds a degree in



CWO GILMAN

animal husbandry from the University of Massachusetts. CWO Gilman entered the Army in 1933, and served with the veterinary service, first in Panama and then with the 7th Cavalry. In 1937 he enlisted in the Marine Corps and was at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese launched their attack. Later, he participated in the campaigns for Tulagi and Guadalcanal.

On recent TAD from his post as OinC of the Quantico stables, Mr. Gilman took part in a roundup at El Reno, Oklahoma. Of the return trip the gunner said, "No horseman has lived until he has spent six days and nights alone in a boxcar with 10 young horses."

☛ **Mrs Jane F. Blakeney** wrote *Your Korean Decorations* as a public service to GAZETTE readers. As head of the Decorations and Medals Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, Mrs. Blakeney was swamped with letters from Marines who wished to know the status of their foreign decorations—hence the article on page 36. A World War I "Marinette," Mrs. Blakeney has been awarded the Good Conduct Medal and the



MRS BLAKENEY

World War I Victory Medal. She is the widow of the former Major Arthur Blakeney, who served with Marine Air Groups 11 and 22 in the Pacific theater during World War II. This article is her first to appear in the Marines' professional magazine.

☛ **Colonel George C. Reinhardt, USA** (*Tomorrow's Atomic Battlefield*, page 16) will be familiar to GAZETTE readers as the co-author of the recent book *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*. Colonel Reinhardt, a veteran of 30 years' service, was commissioned in the Regular Army in 1924 after graduation from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

During World War II the colonel served in Iceland and then in the European theater from Normandy to the Elbe. In 1949 he attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces before joining the staff of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. While



COL REINHARDT

attached to that post he served as an instructor in atomic weapons. This assignment was responsible for his authoritative book. He has also had articles published in several other professional military magazines. Colonel Reinhardt is now Director of the Department of Military Art, Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

☛ **Captain Robert L. Parnell, Jr.**, wrote *Thoughts On All-Weather Fighters* from personal experiences and observations during his 10 years as a Marine Corps pilot.

Entering the Corps through the Aviation Cadet program in 1944, Captain Parnell served at Marine Corps air stations at El Toro, Mojave and Santa Barbara before his first sea assignment aboard the USS *Mindoro*. Since World War II the captain has had tours of duty at Cherry Point, NAS Midway Island, MCAS Ewa (Hawaii) and El Toro, as well as several months with the 1st Marine Air Wing in



CAPT PARNELL

Korea. He is now stationed at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California. This is the first article he has had accepted by a military publication.

☛ **Sergeant Henry I. Shaw, Jr.**, (*A Turn at the Wheel*, page 12) is the Group III (Enlisted) winner of the Marine Corps Association's Prize Essay Contest.


Holder of degrees in history from Hope College (Holland, Mich.) and Columbia University, Sergeant Shaw served with the 1st Marine Division in the Okinawa campaign and in China during World War II. After



SGT SHAW

the war he served with the Michigan National Guard, but rejoined the Marine Corps Reserve in August 1950. Recalled to active duty the following month, Sergeant Shaw served as an infantry squad leader and, later, as editorial assistant for the GAZETTE. Since his release to inactive status in October 1950 he has been a military historian with the Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, in Washington, D. C.

☛ The last article we received from **Captain Harold D. Fredericks** was *Skipper With Two Hats*, published in the July '53 GAZETTE. In this issue (page 24), the captain



CAPT FREDERICKS

writes about a subject dear to the hearts of all Marines—marksmanship. Captain Fredericks entered the Marine Corps through the NROTC program at Holy Cross College in 1947. After graduation from Basic School he joined the FMF in China. Upon his return to the states, Captain Fredericks was assigned to the 5th Marines at Camp Pendleton. A member of the unit when it sailed for Korea in 1950, Captain Fredericks was awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart. He is currently an instructor in Plebe composition and literature at the U. S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. Since taking that post in 1951, Captain Fredericks has been attending the University of Maryland on a part-time basis.

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Many Big Moments begin with a Familiar Ring

Often it's a call you've hoped for and waited for. From someone dear or about something especially important to you. Then suddenly there's a familiar ring. And everything's just wonderful!

Many's the time you would have paid the telephone bill for a whole month—and more—for that one call.

Whenever the telephone rings, it's a reminder of its double value. It keeps you in touch with other people. Helps other people keep in touch with you. Some days the calls you get are even more important than those you make.

Yet the cost of this two-way service is small. Less than a penny an hour for the average family.



**BELL TELEPHONE
SYSTEM**



*"Jack phoned to ask me
to the dance"*



*"A prospect telephoned
to give me a big order"*



*"Bob, Jr., called
to tell me it's a boy"*




*"My Scoutmaster phoned
about a camping trip"*



**Each squad must have within its ranks at
least one man who can replace the squad leader.
The lives of men depend on it**

A TURN AT THE WHEEL



By Sgt Henry I. Shaw, Jr.

PLANNING THE SEIZURE OF A defended beachhead is a task for experts. Hours, days and, in some cases, months of exhausting conferences on logistical and tactical details furnish the background for the co-ordinated inter-service effort that trademarks an amphibious operation. Once the ramps of assault tractors dig into the beach, however, the burden of ultimate success or failure lifts from the shoulders of planners and presses heavily down on those individuals leading small groups of men toward the first enemy objectives. From the moment of landing until a secure foothold is established, it is these small unit leaders who provide the measure of victory.

The Marine Corps officer's basic text points out that "in the amphibious attack the success of initial action will depend on the independent action of the squads." It further emphasizes the extent commanders depend on the leaders of these units because of "the loss of control and decentralization of authority characteristic of the amphibious attack."

Once maneuver room is obtained, decimated units can be withdrawn and replaced in the battle line, strong points can be left for reserve elements and the full power of supporting weapons can be brought into action. Until that time, as the hotly-contested beachlines of Tarawa, Saipan and Peleliu proved, the battle gage is held by the assault squads.

It is axiomatic that the nature of amphibious assault requires highly-trained troops and alert, aggressive leadership at all levels. Much of the emphasis of combat training is directed toward making each small unit a smoothly functioning team.

Ideally, when this training aim is achieved, these leaders and their men will act as one and the result will be combat effectiveness of a high order, the aim of every commander who wants to be successful.

A corollary to this need for highly trained troops is the recognition that an amphibious assault usually means high casualty rates. An objective examination of defended beachheads seized in the past, no matter what area or era is chosen, reveals that a very high percentage of the men who fall are the invaluable small unit leaders. The inference should be obvious. To maintain the impetus of attack, provision must be made for effective leader replacement.

Every branch of the Armed Forces recognizes this truism and emphatically states it in training doctrine. The basic concept that every leader must have an experienced second-in-command ready to take over in emergency is reflected in tables of organization. At every troop level there is someone to step into the shoes of the commander if the need arises. And in every unit, except the assault squad, there is a staff to assist the replacement leader in maintaining the integrity and combat effectiveness of his command. The squad, then, presents a special problem as the only combat unit where undivided responsibility and authority rest in one man, its leader. The squad leader's replacement, whether he is an assistant squad leader in the Army or a senior fire team leader in the Marine Corps, inherits this singular responsibility.

Obviously, the replacement leader must be trained in the functions of command in order to execute his duties effectively. There is, however,

a decided gap between recognition of this doctrine in classrooms, textbooks and regulations, and its execution in the field. The reason for this gap is simple and quite understandable, however inexcusable it may seem to the objective observer.

The easiest method of bringing a unit to peak efficiency for combat is to have the same man conduct its training and lead it through its battle practice. The more familiar the men become with their leaders, the sooner the unit begins to function as a team. In order to achieve this end, some commanders sacrifice the opportunity to train replacement leaders. There is always a premium on time in combat training, and in many organizations the disparity between the principle of training leader replacements and the actual practice grows apace with the pressure of approaching commitment to action.

If the course of combat were as assured as it is in the tactical demonstrations at Quantico, there would be no problem of replacing small unit combat leaders. In the well-known demonstration of amphibious assault that is periodically put on to impress and instruct students at the



Marine Corps Schools, the attacking troops are letter-perfect in their roles. There are casualties, but they are the ones called for in the problem. Realistically as possible, the assault duplicates the actual seizure of a segment of beach as refined by new weapons and methods. To the observer it is valuable as a graphic demonstration of the role that the rifle squad plays in amphibious assault; to the demonstration troops it is merely an exercise, much like a play, where every step is charted beforehand. Action is rigidly confined to a preconceived sequence of events; hours of rehearsal are spent in seeing that no mistakes are made. The end result is a valuable training aid and a splendid exhibition of amphibious tactics.

In one sense, however, this demonstration and others like it are unrealistic. The squad leaders, who perform so excellently for the people in the stands, are following a set pattern. And it is not a set pattern in the sense that an operation plan is, because there is no allowance for individual initiative or reaction to unexpected situations. Virtually nothing is unexpected or unusual in a smoothly-run demonstration. In effect, almost any man who goes through the rehearsal can lead the squad through its predetermined paces. The absence of real opposition and of casualties who fall without regard to plan emphasize the artificial nature of the exercise.

Actual combat requires that the assault squad leader be trained to make decisions and maneuver his unit effectively to influence the course of action. There is only a superficial resemblance between his duties in attacking, with the surety of success, a man-made beach in the Virginia hills and those that will fall to him when he leads his men into the uncertainty of an assault against a fortified enemy shoreline. It is vitally necessary to the success of his unit that he know his job thoroughly and that his men know him. It is equally important that if he should go down under enemy fire there will be someone to take his place and continue to lead the unit effectively in action.

It is not enough to pay lip service to the idea that the senior fire team leader will replace the squad leader. If the second-in-command has never



Regulated procedures and the cheers of the crowd

exercised that command in all its ramifications, then the unit he is expected to lead will not obtain maximum combat effectiveness. If there is anyone who feels that there is so little difference between the job of the fire team leader and the squad leader that additional training is unnecessary to advance from one position to the other, it is to be hoped that he is not a combat commander in our forces.

It should be fundamental to realize that the fire team leader is an active participant in the fire fight and directs men. The squad leader controls units and is a fire director. It is at the squad level that a leader first begins to direct the fire of supporting weapons. It is here that he gets his first experience in influencing the course of an action by use of maneuvering elements. Frequently the squad is committed to independent action and the leader is on his own with no one to make his decisions for him. The leadership of a rifle squad is a position of great responsibility. The decisions of a squad leader may be decisive in the outcome of the battle action of a much larger unit.

Our small-unit training must give repeated opportunity to the second-in-command to exercise the functions of leadership. This does not mean merely the command of troops in formation, the marching of units to and from their various duties, or the routine direction of troops in barracks and bivouac. It has to in-

clude experience in directing combat formations and unit firing and in making the type of decisions inherent in the amphibious assault. In all phases of training, from recruit depot to replacement center, the concept of sustained, unified action despite leader casualties must be emphasized beyond even the point of monotony.

Not every man can be, or wants to be, a battle leader. There are some men who do not want responsibilities, who will do just their job and no more. The time to find these men is before engaging the enemy. The place is the training ground, not the battlefield. And the only sure test, other than actual combat, is to let seconds-in-command, the potential leaders, try their hands.

A mistake costs lives in combat, taking them in a spiraling chain reaction, and inexperienced leaders make mistakes. It is the junior officers, platoon and company commanders, who have the actual responsibility for insuring that the rifle squads have experienced leader replacements. If they sacrifice some of the speed and smoothness that mark a well-trained, well-led organization to spread the experience of leadership, the reward will be greater battle effectiveness. They should aim for that good showing where it will pay off—in combat.

Since it is the junior officers who actually conduct the training of assault platoons, it is really surprising that there is any leadership problem

at all. Every officer's basic schooling emphasizes the same principle. Each candidate is rotated through the various positions of his training unit in order to give him experience in the leadership problems on every level. Why then do so many forget this example when they leave the confines of the school?

Is it because the school itself does not emphasize the importance of applying this principle in the field? Or is it that the field commanders have forgotten their own experiences in training? It would seem that it is a dual responsibility of the officers' school and the field commanders to insure the correct indoctrination of the "brand new" officers.

Right now, in every advanced training unit in this country and abroad, there should be provision in the schedule for training small-unit leader replacements. Every officer and enlisted man should be made to realize that the aim of such a program is to save lives. The competency of squad and fire team leaders is of vital concern to each rifleman as well as to his commander.

The idea that leadership experience should be spread more widely than it is at present is neither new nor radical in concept. Putting the thought in practice would require no substantial alteration in present training programs. What it would demand, however, is recognition throughout all levels in the chain of command that there is such a problem, and that it is being inadequately dealt with today. If there is such recognition, then any implementing directive will meet with the necessary co-operation to improve the situation.

Every assault unit, large or small, has this in common: that the goal of accomplishing its assigned mission overrides every other consideration. Anything that will improve its ability to obtain that objective is vital. Since the nature of the amphibious assault places so much responsibility on the leaders of the smallest tactical units, it is essential that their leadership be of the highest possible caliber. It is necessary also that there be continuity of performance on the part of these units despite leader casualties. Therefore, a program of training which exercises potential small unit leaders in



Uncertainty and hot lead

their responsibilities is vitally necessary insurance for success in combat.


The rifle squad with its attached supporting weapons is the key unit in the amphibious attack. In order to be effective this assault team must be provided with the most experienced and capable leader possible. And if the unit is to accomplish its mission despite casualties, even to the squad leader, then each

squad must have within its ranks at least one man who will be an effective leader replacement.

There is no better time than the present for remedying those defects that still exist in our leadership training programs. It is vital to recognize and develop the abilities of potential leaders. Give them a turn at the wheel. The lives of men depend on it.

US MC

Some are content to follow



RECENT NEWSPAPER ARTICLES have prophesied the use of atomic weapons "on and near the battlefield in significant numbers." How close to the front lines "on and near" implies remains open to speculation, largely because the methods of dropping or shooting these "catastrophes" are not yet quite accurate. ("Shorts" in atomic fire support would bring immense morale problems to say the least.) To cap it all, the words "significant numbers" cannot be translated into an accurate quantity.



Yet, even in its vague form, the idea implies changes in maneuvering the supporting armies that are highly interesting to contemplate.

It is not likely that the use of atomic weapons will cancel the strategic fundamentals set forth in the Principles of War, but it is obvious that we must change our methods of applying those principles. A thorough examination of the problem must consider not only new "hardware," but organizational and tactical considerations as well.

But before tackling the main questions, let's clear the air of several prevailing misconceptions. First and foremost is the exaggerated concern over radiation dangers. Every officer surely knows by now that if he survives the first blast of a reasonably high atomic air burst he can jump into a jeep and speed to the exact spot of ground zero without the slightest risk from radiation. Yet the imagined dangers of ionizing radiation have been publicized so much (especially in earlier publications) that many would still fear to enter a blast area. Consequently the troops are even less prepared mentally for their part in atomic warfare. Misconceptions regarding radiation dangers threaten a basic requirement of warfare—soldiers' confidence in their weapons. Yet we are now renewing the clamor in connection with possible enemy use of ground and underground bursts.

Yes, there is a difference. Both of these types of explosions do carry the threat of ionizing radiation after the explosion. The area of their craters and ring-mounds will be injurious to man for an indeterminate period. Additionally, an area of irregular size and shape, varying with the wind velocity and nature of the soil, will receive casualty-inducing "fall-out"

Tomorrow's Atomic Battlefield





It's ostrich strategy to depend on defense against an atomic attack. Our planning and training should be geared for the offense

... for a brief period. This area will be downwind from the point of burst. The intensity of its activity will diminish rapidly.

But these real risks pose no mysterious, undetectable menace. Our senses can tell us which way the wind blows and we can see the outline of the crater, several hundred yards in diameter and appallingly deep. (Much smaller for the ground than for the underground burst.) We need no radiation monitor to explain those phenomena. His job is merely to tell us when it is safe to enter such areas. While ground and underground bursts will cause radiation casualties, their decreased blast and burn effects make them less effective anti-personnel weapons than the air burst. Consequently, they are lesser risks to soldiers in the field.

A second fixation is professional, not psychological. Dispersion is widely advertised as the one sure protection against atomic blasts. Take that idea apart. Increasing deadliness of weapons has for years required dispersion on the battlefield but it never "protected" any individual from a bullet. "Extended order" replaced close lines so that a bullet aimed at one man would be less likely to hit his neighbor. It "protected" the battalion from destruction by enemy machine guns, if you can use protection in that sense, but it never protected the individual soldier.

Dispersion in atomic warfare does not alter that principle. We should not build important bridges so close one bomb can demolish both, but within units of battalion size or smaller, dispersion is meaningless in the face of atomic weapons' wide area of lethality.

For higher commanders, probably beginning at combat command level, dispersion has a relative value. Primary consideration is, "What is the probability that various elements of my command will become atomic targets?" That in turn depends upon the availability of missiles to the enemy and the importance of a particular unit to the over-all situation. We don't expect our lone jeep to be fired on by 8-inch guns. We increase intervals between vehicles of a convoy only when there is danger of enemy air attack.

Higher commanders should dis-




table target"—no more susceptible to quantitative definition than dispersion. Here again the availability of missiles, our assigned mission and (new consideration) a comparison of the opposing forces must all be weighed to designate a "profitable target" for that particular situation only. Conditions could exist where a concentrated enemy division might not be considered "profitable;" yet it has been said, not entirely in jest, that had the British possessed a single atomic bomb in North Africa their first-priority target would have been Rommel's command car when Rommel himself occupied it.

The fourth sterile idea tries to relate costs of atomic missiles to tactics. Mathematically correct estimates of battles in the last war may demonstrate that atomic missiles can produce enemy casualties at a fraction of the dollars expended to obtain equal results by shell-fire or by aerial bombing. That is no argument for

pending a million-dollar missile on a \$50,000 bridge in certain combat situations. The dollar sign is no help in atomic target selection.

Like every major innovation in warfare, tactical use of atomic weapons has enhanced command problems. Commanders, above divisional rank certainly, will have to resume closer personal control of operations than they did late in World War II when the resemblance of high commanders to the corporation "chairman of the board" was notable. Long years ago that would have entailed merely additional aides-de-camp on fast horses. Now a complex staff organization must be speeded up and personalized.

It is probable that commanders of corps and higher units will be authorized to commit atomic weapons in theaters of war and will be made personally responsible for target selection. That responsibility confers with it the power to per-

With responsibility . . . a magical ability

perse battalions, installations and supplies to the limit compatible with their mission after weighing logistic as well as tactical handicaps induced by dispersion. Camouflage, digging in and frequent changes of position are other aids still neglected. The over-touted dispersion solution has no meaning to small units and is only one of numerous recourses of higher commanders. Obviously, although the fact seems to have escaped most summaries on atomic protection, active rather than passive measures are best. We have the larger stock of bombs. Our primary targets should be enemy stockpiles and delivery agencies.

A third overworked term is "profi-

scrapping conventional artillery or bombing planes. The size of the national stockpile of atomic missiles is the first deterrent, the unsuitability of attacking all targets by packaged catastrophes is a substantial second.

In another variant of this dollar theory we hear that whenever a depot's ammunition stocks exceed the cost of an atomic bomb, guestimated in the press between one and five million dollars, that depot is a lucrative (or profitable if you like) target. On its face that's bunk. The real question is the relative (meaning combat) value of the missile to its owner, the depot's supplies to the other contestant. A good tactical argument can be easily made for ex-

sonally affect the conflict to an extent equal to a magical ability to place entire divisions in position almost instantaneously. What comparable power can be given these leaders to counter hostile employment of atomic weapons?

Offensive action with atomic weapons against a foe occupying relatively stable positions is well within our present staff capabilities. But when we contemplate the meticulous timing involved in employing atomic weapons to shatter a hostile attack, the project is less encouraging. That problem will be covered in more detail shortly. The blackest command picture, however, is the prospect of redeploying our re-

serves, and rallying survivors in stricken units fast enough to counter the almost certain assault which will follow hostile atomic attack.

True, we have already over-emphasized protection against atomic missiles compared to our employment of those weapons. But the emphasis has been on protecting the individual soldier and items of equipment, ignoring greater problems of how our force as a whole will react to atomic blows, and its ability to accomplish its mission despite those blows. True again, if every man and piece of equipment could be "protected" we need have no qualms. But that was never our approach to the menace of enemy artillery or machine guns. We train troops to maneuver so as to lessen effects of hostile conventional fires while continuing on their missions.

How will higher commanders maneuver large elements to ease the effect of atomic fires? We concede that atomic weapons might cause the defeat of any army. Yet, existing tools by which an army commander controls his divisions and his principal means of averting a threatened disaster must be streamlined for atomic combat.

Atomic warfare's tremendous potential falls upon commanders in direct proportion to their rank. At one extreme the theater commander must reckon with all aspects of the new weapons (strategic and political as well as tactical) to accomplish his

mission. Even on the road to final victory, like a boxer ahead on points, he must avoid carelessness which might permit his opponent to knock him out with a lucky punch. This aspect is new. The outcome of the 20th century campaigns were foregone conclusions weeks, if not months, before their termination. In the future, as long as a foe retains appreciable atomic capabilities, he still has a chance for the late-round knockout. The situation is reminiscent of Jellicoe's remark after Jutland: "I was the one man who could have lost the war in a single afternoon."

Quite the reverse is the situation of the battalion commander who is still key man in training troops to withstand the shock of super-weapons. His success is measured by his unit's ability to participate effectively in the exploitation following our use of the missiles, or to rally and reorganize when subjected to losses from enemy atomic strikes. On the battlefield, however, a battalion commander's responsibilities are similar to pre-atomic combat. He cannot possibly keep his unit from becoming a target of hostile missiles, or a victim of friendly ones.

Between these two extremes lies the dividing line where commanders are confronted with responsibility for atomic tactics. Perhaps the division commander is the lowest in rank to be so involved, but it is certain his recommendations for their

use will carry weight. His command is of sufficient numerical and tactical importance, in most instances, to affect materially the over-all issue. Finally, he is, under current organization, the highest ranking commander to have an assigned, and therefore permanent, troop list.

Changes in divisional organization have already been hinted from various sources. The trend of theoretical suggestions points toward a unit capable of both tactical and logistic independence, yet small enough to be an "unprofitable" atomic target, whatever that is supposed to mean. The trend can be attributed to pre-occupation with protection against the weapon to the neglect of our employment of it. Such a trend can invoke results as unfortunate as looking over your shoulder in a foot-race. When did a military force devise an effective organization upon a basis of nullifying enemy fire? Organization must be based upon ability to hurt the enemy. Subordinate units may then be deployed to mitigate the effects of hostile missiles when the situation demands.

One of the newest, yet battle-tested, units of our army pays adequate attention to self-preservation while emphasizing flexible combat power in task force organization. That unit is the World War II armored division.

The armored division has gained flexibility by eliminating the regiment. Its combat commands are its



Atomic fire support — troops must have confidence

invariable fighting elements — they aren't like the "combat teams" used at times by the infantry division.


The armored infantry battalion is not helpless when it is operating on its own. It can take on tasks of varying magnitude assigned by the division commander who alters its composition accordingly. In addition, its "trains command" is more responsive to the division commander's will than the disunited service troops of the infantry division. The former can, and has, fought well under its unified command despite a heterogeneous composition.

staff officers whose training has been broadened to include the tactics of atomic warfare, qualifying them to recognize and recommend priorities among targets. Their task will be to advise the commander on the manner in which his atomic weapons should be fitted into an operation to insure their optimum contribution toward accomplishing the overall mission. As military education progresses, all general staff officers will be expected to meet these requirements, but technical specialists will still be necessary.

Preliminary target selection by

ing missions will carry the allocations of atomic missiles and methods of delivery. However, a corps or a division will be able to *request* atomic strikes not originally planned or provided for whenever their estimate of the situation appears to justify the action.

Staff feasibility tests must support, tactically and logistically, the concept for the employment of atomic missiles. That done, target selection begins in earnest. Tentative lists of targets and target areas made by various agencies are examined, probably by the chief of staff, to eliminate



"Condition of the target . . . effect on civil populace"

On the basis of existing evidence we cannot claim to have the answer to tactical organization for atomic warfare, but we clearly have a hint worth examining.

Fortunately, staff organization is more readily solved. Atomic staff specialists of two types, differentiated by both education and mission, will be needed. One staff group will be technicians, scientifically trained to advise the commander in determining the technical questions of fuse settings, height of burst, bomb power and delivery methods, with a view to accomplishing the maximum effect upon targets of the commander's choice.

The second type will be general

the commander proceeds concurrently with developing the commander's concept of the attack. Overall factors affecting the commander's mission are as always: an evaluation of opposing forces, with special emphasis upon atomic capabilities (our own and the enemy's), and a comparison of our known mission against that deduced for the enemy.

Advance planning may develop requirements for atomic missile delivery which will form the basis for requests for atomic weapons. Usually this planning will take place at higher levels — at army headquarters, for instance. At corps level usually, and almost always at division level, the orders received assign-

those obviously unsuitable. All potential targets passing the initial tests are then carefully analyzed and results assessed in terms of the commander's mission.

Many factors will have to be considered in every case. Some priority must be determined so that when time is short the most important targets can be covered, and the desirable but less essential ones omitted. A list of items might include at least:

1. Condition of target (s) after explosion.
2. Recommended means of atomic missile delivery.
3. Safety of friendly troops.
4. Effect of explosions on our

scheme of maneuver.

5. Enemy active and passive counter-measures against our atomic weapons and also against our exploitation maneuver.

6. Logistic problems of delivery.

7. Comparison of conventional attacks on same targets.

8. Psychological effect.

9. Effects upon civil population.

The commander's decision, resulting from staff recommendations, would in effect be the order directing which target(s) would be hit, time(s), method of delivery and details such as size and type of missile

racy of the means of delivery.

Decisive battles of antiquity, fought with hand weapons and crude missiles, were won by the general who maneuvered his troops more effectively. Sheer numbers did not assure victory. The advent of gunpowder and small arms cramped freedom of battlefield movement in proportion to an army's ability to strike its foes far beyond sword or spear range. Centuries of stereotyped, formalized combat characterized by indecisive battles followed. Wars were won by diplomatic pressures and the so-called "grand ma-

firepower in a single package can alter this idea. Cases will arise where the unusual potency of the "fire-power" will suggest, if not dictate, adoption of a particular maneuver. The frontal assault, direct road to the enemy's vitals but usually cast aside as costly insanity with conventional weapons, may now become the cheapest route with atomic missiles to open the way.

The main concentration of men and guns barring our advance may well comprise the most vulnerable targets for atomic weapons in the foe's entire position. Instead of



Carpet-bombing of St. Lo—preview of atomic war?

essential to obtain expected results. Such a directive would not depart from conventional procedures but become a part of the well-known "five-paragraph order" with one or more additional annexes. Here, another of the conflicting requirements of tactical warfare intrudes. All units concerned will need precise information of atomic strikes near friendly troops, not only to ensure their safety but to assure timely participation in the maneuver which exploits those strikes. Yet secrecy is vital.

Safety of friendly troops is especially complicated by two circumstances: (1) the proximity of the target to our forces and (2) the accu-

neuers" remote from battlefields, the trademark of Marlborough.

Not until the French Armies of Revolution was the now classic concept of "fire and movement" devised. Napoleon's earlier triumphs were masterpieces of its application. The military oracle, Karl von Clausewitz, made it gospel early in the 19th century. A "fire plan" was formulated in support of the maneuver and subordinated to it. Hence our common phrases, "base of fire," "support fires," "artillery preparation." Even those terrific fires that preceded the Normandy landings were essentially aids to the maneuver scheme, not instigators of it.

Atomic weapons' concentration of

searching out, as heretofore, his opponent's weakest point to assault, tomorrow's army commander may deliberately strike at the strongest, proceeding from that destruction to scatter other weaker elements by exploiting columns of armor and swift infantry follow-up. St. Lo's carpet-bombing might be considered a pre-atomic try-out of this idea. Atomic weapons widen the offensive potential.

Yet there is little hope that we can destroy the enemy's will to fight by the sheer destructive power of atomic weapons. Their use must be coordinated with maneuver, regardless of which one dominates a particular plan, to exploit the shock as


well as the destructive effects. A crude rule, cribbed from Napoleon, might be: Exploitation is to destruction as 3 to 1.

No army has yet experienced combat where atomic weapons were employed. Their true shock effect can hardly be estimated. Only one aspect is certain. The first atomic weapons delivered on a battlefield will be infinitely more effective than larger numbers on later fields. World War I lessons of frittering away the surprise value of tank and poison gas point their inescapable moral for campaign plans today.

As we have seen, there are no unsurmountable problems in offensive operations involving atomic weapons, particularly against opponents in relatively permanent positions. Major assaults can be pre-planned as in the past after considering the battlefield potential of the new weapons. Employed for interdiction, they involve no new tactical procedures. However, their use in "preparatory fires" does necessitate carefully worked-out provisions for the safety of friendly troops during the explosions and the swift advance to exploit those explosions despite obstacles probably created by the blasts.

The limited numbers of weapons available demand that each target be selected in the light of its influence upon our mission. Causing numerous casualties may be less important than creating gaps in the hostile position at key, and conventionally impregnable, points. Destruction of enemy material in the field (as distinct from blows at depots and rear establishments) will loom less vital than their neutralization by loss of their crews and operators. The exploiting attack to follow would capture crewless equipment.

All this emphasizes the increased importance of accurate intelligence. To avoid wasting scarce atomic missiles against empty space or non-essential targets, the attacking commander must know his opponent's dispositions at least to a degree of accuracy which approximates atomic weapons' radius of destruction. Moreover, he must possess this knowledge in time to integrate it into his plans. Here especially, streamlined staff procedures for transmitting and evaluating information are vital. All other require-



WW I tank — a bungled debut should warn atomic tacticians

ments of the tactical offensive with atomic weapons can be solved by technological improvements and troop training. Faster, more reliable intelligence remains the crying need.

General Bradley's comment summarizes the prospect of atomic weapons in the defense:

"Atomic bombs will make a formidable defensive weapon if terrain and the defending troops channel aggressor's natural routes of march." Important in that idea is the novelty that we no longer must depend upon conventional combat power to

halt a hostile advance before we can counter-attack. Atomic weapons may, in many instances, produce both a sudden halt and demoralization which our counter-attack can exploit.

Atomic weapons alone, however, cannot hand victory to the defense. The latter must possess an adequate strength in men and conventional fire to compel the enemy to mass if he would advance against them. Obviously "mass" in that sense is relative as always. Our defense must be itself sufficiently concentrated to



Bradley — "... a formidable defensive weapon if ..."

compel enemy concentrations which, consideration of our stockpile and comparison of opposing forces indicate, are worth blasting. There is strong argument that defensive strength must approximate that for a position-type defense to extract maximum benefit from atomic weapons, although that strength should be employed in a mobile role. If both sides use atomic weapons tactically the advantage remains with the defense as in former times. Fox-holes materially reduce the lethal radius of atomic explosions.

Obviously, if we spread out under the mere threat of an enemy's atomic missiles so that he can advance against us without strong concentrations, we negate the value of our own atomic capability. Defensive deployment should be the maximum consistent with accomplishing our mission, locating our reserves to quickly reinforce critical points likely to receive the enemy's atomic blows, and to channelize penetrations to enhance the effects of our atomic counter-strokes.

THE OPTIMUM USE of atomic weapons on defense, no less than in offensive operations, calls for the utmost exploitation of the destruction and shock... Unless we exploit swiftly and ruthlessly, many dazed survivors will rally to fight us again, and much slightly damaged, or merely abandoned, equipment will be recovered for further use against us. This idea normally suggests our counter-attack against an enemy penetration but does not rule out seizing every opportunity to sortie out of our lines in a major raid-type operation, exploiting atomic blasts on unwary enemy concentrations discovered within assaulting distance.

Less favorable defensive employment includes interdictionary atomic blows against enemy concentrations which may lie beyond reach of our raiding capabilities. Lastly, in emergency only, atomic missiles may be used to cover the withdrawal of portions of our force which have been so badly hurt their safe retirement would otherwise be impossible.

In retrograde action every chance of turning upon an eager attacker and hurting him should be sought. Here opportunities for interdiction employment to slow the hostile

progress will predominate; but local opportunities to counter-attack, on divisional or larger scale, still promise the greatest returns for atomic missile expenditure.

While the initiative rests with the foe, as defense requires, higher commanders who personally retain the authority for atomic weapon employment must concern themselves with day-to-day, perhaps hourly, conduct of combat in their sectors. Sudden enemy atomic strikes may

achieved. For the first time since the introduction of mass armies higher commanders may, in some situations by their own actions alone, win victories or suffer major defeats.

In summary, let us remember that we plan and train to maximize our capabilities, not counter those of the enemy. Since we have the greater atomic stockpile but fewer men and tanks, how we employ atomic weapons is vastly more important to the outcome than how an enemy may



"We plan and train to maximize our capabilities"

create emergencies. Our own employment of atomic weapons depends upon precise timing of each blow, almost as much in interdiction as in counter-attacks.

Senior commanders are assured vastly greater personal influence over results on the battlefield. Employing or withholding atomic missiles at a given time and place may affect the issue of major battles to the degree proportionally that Napoleon's personal direction of his reserve guard and cavalry once

use them. If published guesses regarding enemy atomic stockpiles are anywhere near correct, it would actually be a break (professionally speaking) whenever a hostile atomic bomb was used against one of our front-line battalions, or perhaps a regiment... That bomb could have cost us so much more dearly had it hit a vital port upon which our overseas effort might depend. On the reverse of the coin, however, our failure to most effectively employ atomic weapons can mean disaster. US MC



TARGETS!

By Capt H. D. Fredericks



Why 'fire for record' at fixed targets? The enemy won't hold still while we adjust our slings and get into position

✿ "ALL READY ON THE RIGHT—ALL ready on the left—all ready on the firing line . . ."

How many times have you heard those words? How many times have you adjusted your sling and your sights for the sitting position at 300 yards and the prone position at 500 yards? How many times have you carefully noted in your range book the sight settings for your carbine or rifle and then made the necessary adjustments to bring your rounds into the black?

Every year each officer and man in the Marine Corps under 36 years of age is required to report to the range for a week or two of snapping in, trial firing, pre-qualification firing and record firing. For what purpose?

The Marine Corps Manual states in paragraph 24350 that "the ultimate objective of target practice is to develop the ability of individuals and fire units to establish rapidly and then maintain fire superiority over the enemy." It is also implied, not only in the Marine Corps Manual, but also in Marine Corps General Order No. 9, that if men are not able to fire the regular rifle range course, they will at least fire the familiarization course.

It's good to have men know their weapons, to be able to zero them and to prove to themselves and the Marine Corps that they are qualified shooters. It is also a good thing to give the men the opportunity to get the feel of their weapons—to recall

only too vividly what difficulties must be overcome to shoot well with the rifle. But, are we getting our money's worth out of the man-hours and the money expended in ammunition, targets, etc. on the rifle range?

In recent years, the trend in the Marine Corps and, for that matter, in all the Armed Forces, has been towards achieving realism in training. One needs only to pick up a few copies of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE to realize this fact.* Everyone is striving for realism because it is only by simulating combat conditions that the inexperienced can realize what a fire fight will be like. Such things as the introduction of Aggressor forces in our field problems, live firing problems (when the ammunition is available) and an increase in night work help in the approach to realism.

But is it sensible to strive for realism 50 weeks out of the year and then sacrifice that element as soon as we arrived on the range for our annual qualification?

I maintain that we are missing a golden opportunity when we go out to the rifle range, adjust our sights for certain positions, fire at fixed targets and fire only in the daylight. Where is the realism? Can the

*Examples from the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE: *Realism* by Major Leslie A. Gilson, Jr. and Major Martin J. Sexton, June 1952. *Pickel Meadows* by Captain Ralph C. Wood, October 1952.

reader honestly say that he ever saw a sling adjusted in combat? For that matter, how many instances can the reader cite when the men in his unit had the opportunity to lie on raised firing positions and crank off rounds at some fixed target? Granted that the target may have been stationary when the man commenced firing, but very rarely does the target stay that way.

Speaking from experience, I have seen it happen rarely. On the other hand, I have seen men take their weapons, hold them to their shoulders without even a hasty sling and fire at elusive, bobbing, weaving, ducking, half-concealed enemy. Where in a man's training was he prepared for this type of firing? I can hear the proponents of the rifle range answer immediately — "The Marine Corps Manual makes stipulation for just such firing in paragraph 24350 when it says that a man's training in target practice shall advance through four stages culminating in tactical field firing. Moreover, the moving target ranges at Pendleton, Lejeune and Quantico furnish the facilities to conduct this tactical field firing."

Fine, but let's have more of it! How often do units manage to fire on these moving-target ranges? I think everyone will have to admit that it doesn't happen very often. Why?

Well, there are a couple of major reasons why units cannot spend too much time on the moving-target ranges. First and foremost — live ammunition is expensive! Units are allotted only so much ammunition plus what they use on the established rifle ranges. The nation is now very economy minded and therefore more ammunition cannot be allotted. The second reason why units get so little time on the moving-target ranges is the lack of time in the training schedules — a day or two is all that can be allowed, and sometimes even that is difficult to arrange.

And so it results that men go into combat only half prepared for the type of firing they will be called upon to do. In order to prepare them for combat without allotting more ammunition or infringing on other subjects on the training schedule, I offer the following proposal:

I believe that the rifle range as

now established is ideally suited for boot camp. That's the place where men should be taught to fire their weapons methodically. That's where they have to learn all the tricks of the trade which will enable them to bring their rounds into the black. It's where they should be taught the fundamentals of "correct" rifle shooting.

The rifle range as now established in boot camp achieves its purpose admirably and should not be changed one iota. Furthermore, the system is fine for small posts and stations that are fortunate enough to have a range, but don't have the room or funds to set up better training facilities.

But how about the infantry units in the FMF? Should all the officers and men of these units fire the rifle for qualification on these static ranges year after year?

The answer is a hearty and definite "No!" We're not getting our money's worth under the present system, and I believe that it's time for a change.

The first step in changing over would be to have the men go by units to our rifle ranges and spend a couple of days zeroing their weapons. When the process has been completed and the men again have acquired "shooting familiarity" with their rifles, they will be ready for the next stage — live firing on the moving-target range.

How would the moving-target range operate? Well, here's one solution — a sample idea you might call it.

Any irregular piece of terrain would serve, and units would move out in tactical formations from some point designated by the range officer. As a unit moved out, targets would shunt across the front, pop up from behind bushes and stay half-concealed behind the hills and boulders. In other words the unit would be confronted with targets like those that might be met in a moving combat situation.

In another phase of the training a static defense problem could be worked out. An outfit could be set up in foxholes or in a regular defense line where it would be attacked by targets moving towards it.

Those would be the two phases of our annual qualification. Now, with

a little imagination let's see how we could bring even more realism into the action. For instance, why not conduct the defense portion of the qualification course at night?

Picture, if you will, the units emplaced in their defense positions and with normal security established. At some time during the night the enemy attack would develop. Targets, drawn by pulleys, would advance on the emplaced positions just as an enemy would make its drive. Alerted by the security guards, the emplaced units would go into action. Flares could be used to illuminate the targets, and under the direction of unit leaders a grand, one-sided fire fight would develop.

We might even have our mortar-men fire night defensive fires, our machine-gunners lay down their final protective fires and, to achieve even more realism, we might be able to have the artillery fire night problems in conjunction with the annual qualification small-arms firing.

As for the attack phase of our annual qualification, it probably would not be feasible to conduct it at night because of safety limitations. But it could be conducted in all types of weather or at the end of extended field problems when men would be tired, dirty and hungry — the psychological conditions best approaching those found in combat.

The objections to a system of this type would be many. I can hear them now: What system of scoring would be used? Present safety regulations wouldn't permit some of the changes recommended. Wouldn't the cost of setting up such a range be tremendous? How are our non-infantry FMF units going to conduct their annual qualification in small arms?

First we'll tackle the scoring problem. Since the units will be firing together, that's exactly the way they should be rated — as a unit. A system of scoring based on the total number of hits on the targets could be developed, and from it the firing unit would be rated as unqualified, marksman, sharpshooter or expert. A radical change? Perhaps, but a necessary one.

The strongest objections to this method of unit scoring would probably come from those who would say that we are taking away the individ-

ual incentive for good shooting—sparked by personal pride in badges earned. We could compensate for this loss of individual medals by awarding medals to each man based on the qualifying score of his unit.

The proposed system of unit scoring offers advantages not found in our present method of awarding medals for the individual's shooting ability. For one thing, it would do a lot to increase the teamwork of our tactical units. No doubt, all the members of the squad and fire team would do their best to insure that their unit showed up well during the qualification runs. Three of the members of a fire team would undoubtedly help a poor-shooting member by coaching him and giving him help during the zeroing period on the static range.

Secondly, it would increase the competitive spirit among units—a condition I believe most people will support as engendering a healthy attitude when the chips are down. And, of course, from this competitive spirit springs the esprit which is the mark of all good Marines.

For green troops my system would have one rather tangible result—it would show them what a Marine squad or fire team can do when the shooting starts. We must always remember that one of the big questions in the minds of most recruits is, "How will my outfit act in a fire fight?"

The demonstration of firepower, achieved through this type of range work, would bring home to the new Marine the volume of firepower and effectiveness of his unit. He would be convinced more rapidly of the strength of the firepower of a fire team if he participated in the firing, rather than if he just sat in the stands and watched another fire team go through a demonstration.

Therefore, the unit scoring system would not only keep most of the advantages which we have today—pride in our ability to shoot and the honor of wearing marksmanship badges—but it would also increase the spirit of competition, build up a greater pride in unit and augment the spirit of co-operation and teamwork.

Safety regulations must be strict because of the danger to human lives when live ammunition is employed. And it would certainly re-

quire a board much more experienced than I to determine what those regulations should be.

The firing in the defensive situation would be the easiest to control and regulate. Only those men on the main line of resistance (a firing line composed of foxholes and bunkers rather than a level firing line) would be permitted to fire. The unit leaders would have to exercise the maximum amount of control over their men and they would be the ones held responsible for any promiscuous firing and for the enforcement of safety regulations. This system, besides fulfilling the requirements laid down in the safety regulations, would enable the unit leaders to practice their fire-control techniques.

The firing connected with the tactical march situation sets up a more difficult problem, but not an impossible one. The line of march would naturally be laid down by the range officer. Along the line of march would be placed phase lines and boundary lines marked with white tape. No troops would be allowed ahead of these lines, and all men firing when a target appeared would have to move to the white lines. So the tapes would, in effect, serve as a firing line. Granted that much experimenting and testing would have to be conducted before the safety regulations for this system approximated the refined set of safety regulations now in force. But the important thing is that it is not impossible.

It would be a fallacy to state that it would cost nothing to implement such a range—in fact, if we had to start from scratch the initial cost would be quite high. However, we already have some of our materials at hand. We could use the moving-target ranges as they are now established. It might be necessary to change their location or to re-arrange the equipment, but the targets and the mechanisms to run the targets are already on hand. What is not available would have to be built, but since none of the mechanism is very complicated (frames, gears and pulleys) the cost to build new targets would not be too high. The pits behind the targets for the range personnel could be dug easily with the help of a bulldozer.

Therefore, we can probably figure

that the initial cost of setting up the ranges would be held to a minimum and, once built, their maintenance would cost no more than for our present ranges. The ammunition expenditure would remain about the same as it is now.

Some people will say that the system I have proposed would be alright for infantry units of the FMF, but would not work out for small posts and stations or service units. However, I believe the plan could be adapted to non-infantry units.

We have seen how supporting ele-



Practical . . . and tactical

ments have been organized into provisional platoons in Korea. Perhaps we could organize non-infantry units for annual qualification on the tactical range in a like manner. Such organization would help to emphasize the Marine Corps' concept of every Marine being essentially a fighting man whether he is a cook, mechanic, truck driver or supply chief.

Permit me to be the first one to admit that this article just scratches the surface of the problem. I know its limitations. However, I know there must be many Marines who feel that our present system of qualification firing on formal ranges is inadequate to train men for combat. If we could all pool our thoughts on the subject, the Corps would certainly benefit.


So, if you have ideas on this particular subject, send them in to the Marine Corps Development Center at Quantico. I understand it is interested in receiving plans covering this particular field.

The urgent need for realism on the range is evident. Let's do something about it.

US MC



By Capt R. L. Parnell, Jr.



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
If it's easy to fly, has good

radar and can deliver


W

sure-death, you've got

a real all-weather fighter . . .



on all-
fighters



ONE OF THE MOST THOUGHT-provoking, pertinent and timely aspects of Marine aviation is currently being emphasized, explored and discussed wherever Marine units fly. I refer to the all-weather fighter program within the Corps.

This is not an attempt to predict or reveal; it's just an accumulation of one individual's thoughts on the all-weather fighter program and its impetus on the missions of Marine aviation. At the outset let me remind the reader that the "all-weather fighter" is considered to be just that; not strictly a "night fighter."

In the close support of our own ground units the use of an all-weather fighter appears to have a bright future defensively and offensively.

Defensively, a high-performance, truly all-weather configured aircraft, directed by effective ground intercept control methods, will afford an

efficient and relatively economical safeguard against attack by enemy planes on our front lines during darkness or bad weather. Closer scrutiny of this basic thought leads one to the conclusion that much is involved in perfecting a workable combination between ground control units and aircraft. Operators on the ground must be thoroughly familiar with the endurance and speed capabilities of aircraft, as well as the inherent limitations of pilots, if they are to direct consistently quick, simple and foolproof interceptions between friend and foe. The necessity of positively identifying enemy aircraft by use of ground radar and the need for tracking their course further complicate the problem for the ground controller.

At the same time, the aircraft must be equipped to fly effectively in any weather an enemy may use to screen his attack. The pilot must

not be hopelessly overwhelmed by the complexity of flying the all-weather aircraft or operating simultaneously any part or all of the airborne equipment necessary for a speedy, successful interception and destruction of the enemy. Furthermore, the pilot must at all times roughly track his course through the air. During an interception he follows innumerable headings, speeds and altitudes prescribed to him by the ground controller. Potential emergencies or lost air-to-ground communications demand this safety procedure.

Offensively, the all-weather fighter, equipped with package guns, bombs or even adaptations of special weapons, should prove a very valuable close-support and interdiction weapon when utilizing precision-bombing techniques now possible with advanced ground control methods. Airborne radar, carried in a "mother plane," has also been perfected to automatically steer suitably equipped fighters to a point far removed from ground control units where extremely accurate bomb drops can be made. Thus in utter darkness or foulest weather, close support can be provided friendly troops or strikes directed deep into enemy territory.

Again, the prerequisites mentioned earlier concerning speed, simplicity and accuracy must be met before the all-weather fighter becomes an effective close-support weapon.

In helping fulfill our primary mission of close support, the all-weather fighter could be employed in relatively large numbers operating independently or in small elements simultaneously over extended areas. Apparent limitations to numbers used are:

1. Control agency capabilities and availability.
2. Needs of supported units.
3. Aircraft ordnance and range capabilities.

It does not appear feasible, as a related thought, to operate large numbers of all-weather fighter aircraft in formation. The tactical effectiveness of a given number of these aircraft, utilized over a predetermined span of time, delivering prolonged supporting efforts during inclement weather conditions, will probably be much greater than if an attempt were made to deliver in a

single mission the total efforts of the same number of all-weather aircraft. Several reasons for this premise come to mind. First, the practical safety of close-knit formations of aircraft flying in divisions and units of divisions over great distances and through all-weather flying conditions is questionable. Such an effort cannot logically and with desired safety be controlled, led, or expected to achieve optimum results in a close-support mission with the equipment now operational. The use of mass formations of all-weather fighters in close-support missions seems well beyond the bounds of "calculated risk."

Secondly, the tactical aspects of launching, rendezvousing, controlling and recovering formation flights of all-weather aircraft operating in their element pose problems that are formidable indeed. A shuttle or stream principle, producing optimum results with maximum safety and minimum exposure to the cumulative effect of human error found in formation flying, appeals to the mind as a practical and psychologically sound utilization of all-weather aircraft in close support. Further, the results obtained by single planes in controlled, close sequence should guarantee economy through increased accuracy; and finally, the effect of such a prolonged harassment of the enemy would be of untold value in relieving pressure on friendly troops.

In the defense of hard-won, advanced naval bases, the all-weather fighter is a logical answer to the vital problem of protecting such bases from the devastation of enemy planes attacking under cover of weather or darkness. The tactics devised in this defense will naturally vary with the local situation. But the use of all-weather fighters to harass the enemy's bases and deter or stop inbound bombers are basic needs likely to be felt in any situation.


If this protection is to be indirect, it may consist of all-weather fighter sweeps in sequence during poor weather or darkness on enemy bases to destroy or divert the fighter potential of the enemy. If it is to be direct protection, it may well be composed of all-weather fighters patrolling under the immediate guidance of ground intercept units and forming a barrier across the



F4D: a new all-weather fighter

route of enemy bombers intent on flying in for a kill. Or a direct protection tactic may involve the sector-altitude barrier patrol used with close cover. The latter method will prove relatively expensive in that numerous all-weather fighters will be required, and the ground control units necessary to co-ordinate effectively such an effort may be excessive. It may be practical to include within a friendly bomber formation an airborne, intercept-control unit which, like a mother hen, would keep her brood of all-weather chicks hovering above and below the formation as it advanced deep into enemy territory. Any avenging hawks rising to challenge the bombers would discover themselves facing a determined and hard-to-elude force of fighter aircraft. Successful delivery of retaliatory special weapons could be greatly enhanced by such use of all-weather fighters, assuming friendly bombers will use weather and darkness to avail themselves of the special kind of protection provided by airborne intercept-controllers and their fighter brood.

In augmenting or replacing carrier units, Marine all-weather fighters would naturally function under immediate control of the Navy. Flying from carriers, they could provide protective combat air patrols during darkness and bad weather. They could escort carrier-based bombers to and from their targets, and per-



Weather fighter for Marines

form close support or advanced base defense missions from shipboard.

Obviously, the all-weather fighter fits into each mission of Marine aviation, but the uses and tactics described earlier are mostly theoretical—not proven in combat. The thoughts of probable faults in equipment, pitfalls in tactics, doubts caused by unknown enemy capabilities and effects of combat environment are quick to enter the mind.

We know we do not have in operation a truly all-weather fighter. The problems of better instrumentation, greater range and performance, increased firepower, more effective radar and fast, efficient ground control are looming before those responsible for the all-weather fighter program. Even more pressing is the need for a decision on the question of configuring our all-weather fighter to be a one-place or two-place aircraft. That is, shall we have the pilot performing all the many and skilled operations involved in advanced all-weather flight, or shall we give him a specially trained technician to do the delicate work while he flies the plane? There is such a strong diversity of opinion among pilots on this question that no clear-cut objective statement of pros and cons on the subject has yet been made known. It does appear that a need may exist for both types, but that is beyond the scope of this article. The fact that this burning

question exists, however, is certain to have an undesirable effect on the all-weather fighter program beyond the effects of healthy, competitive spirit.

On the credit side of the ledger we can point out that we have an all-weather fighter program, struggling and groping though it may appear. We have it and thereby hold a foot in the doorway leading to truly all-weather tactical flight. The F3D Skyknight, though far below anticipated performance in its earlier versions, will go down in history as the first naval aircraft designed, produced and combat proven as an all-weather fighter. All previous all-weather fighters in the Naval Service have been impromptu modifications of other basic designs, or designs developed for other services. The F3D is the current Marine all-weather fighter; and despite its well known, often over-emphasized shortcomings, it is a giant stride in the right direction.

On deck we have the F2H-4, an all-weather version of a basic day-fighter design. With its outstanding performance, maneuverability and stability, it should fit well into the mission of defending advanced naval bases, whether land or carrier-based, and be able to deliver all-weather close support as well.

Beyond these two, the average pilot knows little of future design. We hear of F4Ds, F10Fs, A3Ds and other craft reaching toward the barrier in speed and able to climb at phenomenal rates. Marine pilots may fly any or all of these new aircraft, but when the family tree of all-weather fighters again buds forth, let's hope the responsible parties remember some logical thoughts along the following line:

The all-weather fighter must be easy to fly, simple to operate and equipped with sure-death armament. To maintain our nation's advantage in all-weather experience, we should have an aircraft which can be mastered quickly by relatively inexperienced pilots. This specification appears necessary because of the tremendous demand for all-weather pilots likely to develop if war begins.

The basic policies on the all-weather program should be objectively defined, implemented and pushed. Fear of new ideas or the dreaded risk those in high places

must take to make progress in this day and time should be forgotten.

Raw material of the best quality is needed in the all-weather program. It does not appear wise to subject newly graduated pilots to the rigors of genuine all-weather flying. The new pilot should be trained in basic tactics and allowed to acquire the natural feel of continuous teamwork in other types of flying before being confronted with the many new methods of controlled, all-weather flying.


A further thought or two on the all-weather fighter program. If the program is to be all-weather, the greater part of the training should involve weather or night flying. To achieve this end in a practical way, all-weather aircraft groups, operating during hours of daylight and darkness, could be inaugurated. The problems associated with such an innovation would be manifold. Consistent efforts to perfect all-weather fighter tactics would be required. Changes in accepted working routines and working environment would be essential, and the submission of present training tactics to the needs of the basic all-weather program would have to be accepted.

Co-ordination between the all-weather fighter groups and ground control agencies would reach a new high as the necessity for inter-dependency became obvious.

The all-weather fighter program should not be pushed at the expense of other phases of Marine aviation. By the same token, no compromise in crews, equipment, facilities or training should be considered where the all-weather fighter program is concerned.

These, then, are thoughts on all-weather fighters, on the program and on how it fits into the three-fold mission of Marine aviation. We have an edge in this field. No one has yet announced, in equivalent terms, the advantage proper electronic equipment gives an all-weather fighter over its day-configured contemporaries. But it's reasonable to assume the advantage is tremendous, as evidenced by the F3D's record in Korea. Let's develop our advantage in true all-weather fighters and devise the tactics that will make the all-weather fighter another weapon as characteristically Marine as close air support itself.

US MC




WHEN THE ROADS GIVE OUT

He doesn't need a graded road and he won't get soaked in

by the weather. Don't retire the pack horse without a hearing





By CWO Kenneth Gilman

IN CONSIDERING ANIMALS AS A transportation medium in this mechanical "zoom" age, one runs the risk of being tagged an old fossil who has bucked the line once too often without his helmet on.

While no reasonable man believes that wheeled and tracked vehicles can be replaced by four-footed beasts of burden in modern warfare, any leader with common sense and a little service under his belt knows that there are times when the pack horse can be invaluable.

For wars, unfortunately, are not

always fought on ground where armies can get to each other with their high-powered equipment. And in this military era of jet planes, helicopters and atomic weapons it is very easy to overlook a method of transportation that has always served us well.

Then, when finally stymied by saw-toothed ridges, or when plodding through ankle-deep mud on a beat-up road, we find that we must return to the old standby—our four-footed friend.

Take General Mark Clark's cam-

paign in Italy, for instance, or the Greek Government's war against Communist guerrillas in 1948. Both campaigns were fought in mountainous country where it was impossible to take mechanized equipment. The mechanized units carried the men and supplies as far as they could, then they were forced to bow to the pack animals.

If you're still not convinced, then think about Korea. Packing a boatload of ammo or chow up those narrow trails, how many times did you pause and wish you had a good "bang-tail" to carry the load?

Of course, our problem in Korea was solved to some extent by using native carriers, but although the use of the *Cargadores* was one solution, it wasn't the best one from a security point of view. In appearance a North Korean looks just like the average South Korean, thus it was easy for enemy agents to infiltrate among the hired carriers.

But aside from the fact that horses won't talk and give away military secrets, there are other arguments in favor of using the pack animal. For one thing, humans were not meant to be beasts of burden. You cannot compare man's endurance to that of horses, donkeys or mules. To carry a burden is the equine's lot on this earth.

So, experience in the past and in the present has proved that on frequent occasions it has been necessary to call upon pack trains to further our military effort. In all probability they will be needed again and it behooves us to do something about the situation. How then do we go about organizing such outfits? What would their capabilities be and what logistical problems would present themselves?

First, you need the personnel—men who are known for their quiet courage and love of animals. The wise officer will select his horse handlers with as much care as he selects the animals.

However, there should be no personnel problem in picking a good pack outfit. The Corps enlists men from all walks of life and a good percentage of them come from farms and ranches—men who know and love animals. Many of the young officers coming into the Corps today have had college training in animal husbandry, and I feel sure these offi-

cers would jump at the chance to get into a pack-train outfit. With the aid of available manuals (FM 25-5 and FM 25-7) they could co-ordinate their knowledge of animals with military needs, and a pack train second to none could be organized and trained within 10 weeks.

A trained cadre of officers and enlisted men could easily be maintained at a minimum of expense by intensifying our present pack-horse course now established at the Marine Corps Schools.

At the present time this two-week course trains only junior officers—a good idea, but enlisted men should also receive the training. A farm boy, trained for a month, would learn enough animal husbandry and pack procedure to be a great asset to the field commander plagued by mountain supply problems.

Now about the animals themselves. Pack animals should be of a compact and sturdy build. Oriental horses are a good example of the pack-type animal. They are as rough and woolly as a bear and have the endurance and agility of a hungry tomcat.

An officer experienced in judging animals for their worth would have to be assigned the task of selecting the initial herd so as not to get immature animals or those over 10 years of age. The best age bracket is between six and nine years.

For training or for actual use on a campaign it is best that the animals be procured locally. By picking them up in the area of operations you get animals that are acclimated and indigenous to the country.

An argument often heard against the use of horses or mules is that they must be fed and cared for even when they aren't working. It's true, of course, that the expense of feeding and care goes on, but when the animals aren't working their maintenance cost is negligible. The problem is solved simply by turning them loose to graze during periods of non-use.

Periodic returning of the animals back to the wild state on good grazing is most beneficial to the animal. It rejuvenates his tired muscles and system in general. If prudence is exercised in the selection of the rest area (plenty of grass and water) the animals will be in fine shape when their services are required again.

When the horse is used for carrying heavy loads his feed requirements must be augmented with some form of grain. The working pack horse requires one pound of grain per day for every 100 pounds of body weight. His roughage needs are about a pound-and-a-half per 100 pounds. Feeding is very important in horse husbandry and the subject is well covered in FM 25-5.

We have discussed the personnel and the animals. Now let's see how this group should be organized into a pack train for operation in a combat area. For the record, let's discuss



"Quiet courage and love of a"

a typical pack train—one made up of 41 horses. Here's how it would be set up:

Animals: 41 pack horses.

Equipment: 41 pack saddles with related equipment, a veterinary kit and a horseshoe kit.

Personnel: a company-grade officer (train CO), a Staff NCO (pack-master and assistant train commander), 4 sergeants (pack-squad leaders), a corporal (horseshoer and animal first-aid man) and 40 privates or Pfc's (packers and handlers).

It makes a simple organization, a fact that contributes to its success. For administrative purposes the outfit might be called a platoon and it may be attached to the service company of the battalion it supports.

An added thought on equipment. The Phillips pack saddle and its

simple, related equipment is second to none in essential gear. In a matter of two or three weeks men can be taught to use it with gratifying results. The "China Special," originally designed for the Asiatic horse because of his small, compact build, is an exact duplicate of the Phillips cargo saddle. The saddle is well padded and built to withstand rough use—comfort of the animal while under pack is the keynote of its design.

Pack outfits should be moved into their area of operations by truck or some other carrier. They should not

R4D type of aircraft, for instance, is capable of carrying 20 heavy horses or 25 Asiatic ponies along with their pack saddles and equipment.

Certainly the horse should not be on the road or trail as long as wheels can turn and move supplies effectively. But when reconnaissance has indicated that further advance will be over rough terrain not suited to motor transport or tracked vehicle travel, then the pack train should be brought forward to proceed with the supplies so necessary to the infantry's successful operation.

Once the pack train is in the area of operations and disembarked from its carriers, the pay load and the supplies for the train would be distributed as equally as possible over the 41 animals. Thirty of them would carry pay loads of 175 pounds each. Eight would be loaded with 175 pounds (each) of hay for emergency hay rations, two of the animals would carry 180 pounds apiece of grain for daily grain rations and one horse would pack the field rations for the handlers.

In addition to the pay load, all horses, except those carrying grain only, would pack an additional five pounds of grain (one day's ration). The veterinary kit weighs 10 pounds and is secured to the pack of the toughest horse. Extra shoes are hitched to the lower part of the pack saddle of each horse. The horse-shoeing kit is carried by the horse-shoer—it consists of one pound of extra nails, a 14-ounce shoeing hammer, clinching block, rasp, knife and pincers.

As the daily grain ration is expended, another animal will be made available and the loads of the others may be cut down. The same will be true of the emergency hay ration—its expenditure will permit redistribution of the pay load. Thus as the third day's march is started, all horses will be carrying lighter loads.

A 41-horse pack outfit of the type just described could carry a pay load of over five thousand pounds. The distance it could travel without additional forage support would be directly proportional to the amount of natural grazing found along the supply route. It is interesting to note in studying the campaigns of Merrill's Marauders in Burma, that an abundance of green forage was found all along the seven-hundred-

mile route taken by the pack trains. This fact made it possible to reserve the emergency forage (hay) for more sparse areas.

If the pack train is bivouacked at night with an eye toward good grazing for the animals, it will get enough forage in a five to six-hour period to maintain the animals' strength. An Asiatic pony, for instance, given about three pounds of oats before being turned out to graze for the night, would consider himself fortunate. Two more pounds of oats should be fed each animal in the morning about two hours before resuming the march.

If the tactical situation does not permit grazing, then the packers must turn to with their machetes and cut enough roughage for their animals. In addition, whenever the train is halted the animals must be allowed to browse along the trail, eating leaves or whatever is available—one of the advantages that accrues from selecting horses native to the area of operations. Such horses are used to the natural fodder.

When scouting for a route of march, scouts must be on the alert for good grazing and water. Mountains and hilly country usually have small streams and springs from which the animals can drink their fill. Under normal conditions each horse will require about eight or 10 gallons a day, depending on the temperature.

With an outfit properly trained, and with the animals properly cared for, a pack train such as I have described could carry a pay load hundreds of miles. Why, then, don't we use them?

There seems to be a growing tendency today for young Marines to look for a mechanical means of transportation even as they stand gazing at the ever-reliable horse. There is a reason for this attitude, of course. We Americans have an inherent dislike for going backwards and using an older method of travel or operation once we are used to more modern means. It is an excellent trait deserving of encouragement—unless it tends to forfeit good judgment.

Since in carrying out our mission we've often found ourselves operating in terrain where motorized units are useless, I say packhorse outfits would be worth their salt. US ♣ MC




and "care of animals"

be marched up to the point where they are needed as it expends their strength and wastes valuable time. They should be held in readiness at some place in the rear until they are called for.

A pack train of 41 animals with personnel, a three-day supply of emergency forage and necessary equipment would require the following vehicles to move it into position: four semi-trailer stake bodies for hauling animals, two personnel carriers for hauling packers and two 2½-ton vehicles for hauling equipment and emergency forage. (Additional trucks would have to be provided to haul the pay load up to the operating area.)

In recent years there have been many cases where horses and mules were carried by air transport. The

YOUR KOREAN DECORATIONS



*Taikuk Distinguished
Military Service Medal*

Watch for new ribbons if Congress authorizes ROK awards; meanwhile you should know what they're all about

By Jane F. Blakeney

IN OCTOBER 1951, THE FIRST decoration presented to a United States Marine by the Republic of Korea was received by the Decorations and Medals Branch at Headquarters Marine Corps. It was the Order of Military Merit with silver star, awarded to LtGen Oliver P. Smith, and it is the only one of its kind to be conferred on a member of the Marine Corps to date.

But since the first one, President Syngman Rhee has awarded 109 other Korean decorations to Marines. He has also awarded one Korean PUC to the 1st Marine Brigade, two PUCs to the 1st Marine Division, two to the 1st Marine Air Wing and one to the USMC Advisory Group.

Since Marines may be wearing these decorations one day, it's worthwhile to know something about them, and the steps being taken to obtain Congressional recognition and approval.

First we'll take the personal decorations which come in four different classes—the Taikuk, the Ulchi, the Chung Mu and the Wharang medals.

In the Korean method of awards, the deed performed has no bearing on the type of award made, except in the case of the Wharang medal. In all other cases where an individual is to be decorated for a deed of valor or heroism, his rank at the time of presentation determines the decoration he receives.


Thus we find that the Taikuk, with a gold star* is awarded only to generals, and the Taikuk with silver star is awarded to lieutenant generals and major generals. Brigadier generals are eligible for the Ulchi with the gold star, while colonels and lieutenant colonels receive the same medal with a silver star. The Chung Mu goes to majors, captains and all other commissioned officers, with the majors wearing the gold star and others the silver star. The Wharang is given to all others below commissioned rank, with the gold star, silver star or the plain medal, without a star, being awarded according to the deed performed and the degree of heroism.

The background and heraldry surrounding these medals is interesting, and it merits going into at this point.

The Taikuk medal is named after the national colors of the Republic of Korea. The colors appear in the center of the medal and in the center of all ribbons as a rosette. This medal is the ROK's highest award.



Since October 1951, 110 ROK awards to Marines



The second highest award of Korea is the Ulchi medal, named for General Ulchi Munduk who lived about 3,000 years ago. During the Ko Kuryo Dynasty in Korea, an invasion force of about 1,300,000 Chinese crossed the Yalu River and

swarmed to the key fortress at Anju. General Ulchi ordered the Chong Chong River dammed up; and when the enemy had encircled the fortress, Ulchi had the water released. As a result, the majority of the Chinese invaders were drowned.

The Chung Mu medal, a third-grade medal, received its title from a Korean national hero who lived about 360 years ago—Admiral Chung Mu of the Korean Navy. At that time the Japanese Army and Navy

threatened the Rhee Dynasty of Korea. Admiral Mu invented a submarine shaped like a turtle, and with the aid of this weapon annihilated the Japanese fleet and brought final victory to Korea. It will be noted that the symbol of the turtle appears on the medal.

Wharang was the title given to a group of young warriors—all of them teen-agers. They came from the families of distinguished classes in the days of the Shinra Dynasty.

*When the gold or silver star is awarded with any medal, it is attached to the suspension ribbon. A gold or silver star, similar to the U. S. type, is also affixed to the ribbon when it takes the place of the medal. It should be worn over the Taikuk rosette and the red portion of the Taikuk must be worn up.

These Wharang warriors engaged in all the wars and performed gallant deeds and acts of valor to encourage the troops. In commemoration of this group the fourth grade of decorations is called the Wharang medal.

As with United States decorations, only one medal is awarded to any one individual. Subsequent awards of the same medal are designated by an oak leaf cluster. As an added bit of information it might be noted that the relative rank of the award is denoted in the ribbon. The Wharang, or lowest-ranking award, has only one stripe on each side, while the Taikuk, the highest of the four, has four stripes on each side.

The names of the medals as they have appeared here are the quasi-official accepted spelling. The reason behind the apparent differences in spelling of the names of the various awards is in the interpretation from Korean (based on the sound of the word) to the anglicized phonetic spelling. Thus Taikuk may also appear phonetically as Taiguk, Tae Kook, Tai Kuk, Tae Kuk, etc. The individual interpreter may in any case influence the actual spelling. In the near future the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea will establish a standard, anglicized spelling of the name of each award, and regulations will be promulgated.

It will also be noted that there are some differences in the design of medals and decorations of the same type. There are several reasons for these variations. One stems from the fact that medals of a new design were struck off in June of 1951, which accounts for some differences in design of the same medal. Other variations that exist may be caused by deviations from specification by different manufacturers.

Differences are also found in the ribbon bars given with the Korean PUCs. Two of the ribbon bars awarded with the citations were alike, but a third had an extra stripe. No doubt these differences will be straightened out once the citations are approved by Congress.

Now for the question you have plagued the Medals and Decorations Branch with since 1951. When can you wear your Korean medals and ribbons? The answer—as soon as



Korean PUC: more honors for the Corps

Congress gives its approval. A public law covers the regulations governing acceptance of foreign medals and decorations, but specifically for the Marine Corps, paragraph 20013 of the manual is the authority. This particular paragraph was taken from the public law and it states that "no person holding any position of profit or trust under the United States shall, without consent of Congress, accept any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince or foreign state. Any present, decoration or citation which shall be conferred or presented by any foreign government to any officer or enlisted man of the United States civil, naval or military shall be tendered through the Department of State unless so authorized by Congress."

When the bestowal of a foreign decoration is made under such circumstances that its refusal would prove embarrassing to the power conferring it, the individual may accept it. He should, at the same time, inform the donor that he is accepting it subject to approval of Congress. The recipient must then forward the decoration to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for further transmittal to the Department of State. He should not obligate himself or the United States in any way.


Unit citations are handled in a like manner. Although the Secretary

of the Navy may authorize a unit in the Naval Establishment to accept a foreign unit award without Congressional approval, legislation must be instituted to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to grant permission to individual members of a unit to receive and wear the ribbon of any unit citation which may be accepted.

The procedure involved in obtaining Congressional approval is as follows:

After the Medals and Decorations Branch makes the necessary verification in each individual case of the name, rank, period of service and the services performed as referred to in the citation, a letter is then addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations. It is written over the signature of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and it states that neither the Marine Corps nor the Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals interposes any objections to the acceptance of the decoration. The letter also states that if approved in accordance with existing statutes, the decoration and citation will be forwarded to the Department of State where they will be held in safekeeping until the man concerned may be legally authorized to accept them.

After the CNO informs the Commandant that he approves of the acceptance of the awards in question, he requests the Commandant to sponsor necessary legislation. A letter is then sent to the Secretary of



**General Smith's Order of Military Merit:
Safe in the vault of the State Department
until legislation is passed by Congress**

State, forwarding the decoration and citation and requesting that the State Department hold the items until such time as Congress shall authorize their acceptance.

To obviate the necessity of sponsoring individual legislation for each award, the Judge Advocate General, Navy, directed that the Marine Corps screen and compile a list of the names of the personnel concerned, this list to be included in the State Department Omnibus each year, commencing on October 1, 1950.

These instructions have been com-

plied with each year and the names of all persons for whom awards have been received since October 1, 1951, as well as the Korean PUCs awarded to the 1st Mar Div, 1st MAW and the USMC Advisory Group, were included in the list submitted on October 1, 1953.

Blanket legislation for the acceptance of all foreign decorations by military and civilian personnel of the United States has been provided for in the Department of Defense legislative program each year since 1951, but as yet Congressional approval has not been given.

So up to press time that's the way things stand. And until legislation is passed granting permission to wear the citations and awards the situation will remain static.

Meanwhile, LtGen Oliver P. Smith's medal will remain in the State Department vault . . . and so will yours. US MC

NAVY PUC AWARDS

(Eligibility dates)

1st Mar Div

Inchon-Seoul: 15 Sept 50, to 11 Oct 50

Chosin-Koto-ri: 27 Nov to 11 Dec 50

1st Mar Brig

Korea: 7 Aug to 7 Sept 50

1st MAW

Inchon-Seoul: (certain elements) 15 Sept to 11 Oct 50

REPUBLIC OF KOREA PUC AWARDS

(Eligibility dates)

1st Mar Brig

Pusan: 2 Aug to 6 Sept 50

1st Mar Div

Inchon: 15 Sept to 27 Sept 50

Yudam-ni-Bunker Hill: 26 Oct 50 through 15 Feb 53

1st MAW

Pusan: 3 Aug 50 to 26 Feb 51

North Korea: 27 Feb 51 to 11 June 53

Advisory Group

30 Oct to 1 Nov 52

KOREAN SERVICE MEDAL

There have been a total of 10 stars authorized for wear on the Korean Service Medal.

27 June 50 to 2 Nov 50

3 Nov 50 to 24 Jan 51

13 Sept 50 to 17 Sept 50

25 Jan 51 to 21 Apr 51

22 Apr 51 to 8 July 51

9 July 51 to 27 Nov 51

28 Nov 51 to 30 Apr 52

1 May 52 to 30 Nov 52

1 Dec 52 to 30 Apr 53

1 May 53 to ———



By Capt P. E. Sanders

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(Conclusion)

☛ ONE OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF the tank is its high silhouette which makes it quite a target compared to the man on the ground. Of course the tank's armor stops small-arms fire and small-caliber mortar and artillery shells but, as most of us know, some high-velocity and shaped-charge shells can put a tank out of action in a hurry.

In action a tank will normally draw a lot of small-arms fire. It's natural for enemy riflemen to concentrate their fire on such a huge target, and the tank commander knowing this will usually stay buttoned up (all hatches closed) during the fire fight. Most of the normal small-arms fire will pass over the infantryman if he hits the deck—the highest part of his body then being only a foot off the ground. But if the tank commander has to come up out of his hatch he is about 12 feet above the ground, which makes him very conspicuous and therefore a poor insurance risk.

Thus it is that you seldom see a tank commander climb out of his tank in the heat of battle to shoot the breeze with the infantry leaders. With all the lead bouncing off the hatch the commander naturally will prefer to talk to the infantry over the phone or the radio. It would be foolish for him to do otherwise.

If he becomes a casualty, he greatly reduces the efficiency of the crew and jeopardizes the tank itself.

The phone and the radios were put in the tank especially to provide communication with the infantry. The phone works fine if it is used properly, but there have been times when the infantryman would forget to operate the butterfly switch which had to be pushed when talking and released when listening. The new improved tank phones do not have this feature, and are easier to operate.

The radios are not too reliable. They may work perfectly at the start of the day's operation but after the tank bounces around a bit the radios may go out. This situation makes the infantry unhappy but it makes the tankers even unhappier, especially the tank platoon leader who might be placed in the position of being forced to watch one of his tanks head for destruction without any way to warn it of the danger ahead.

Another bad feature of the tank is its limited visibility. Only the tank commander can see reasonably well. The driver, bowgunner, loader and gunner have their vision restricted by the limited field of vision of their periscopes, and they can't see much, particularly when the tank is moving and lurching badly.

When the tank is buttoned up the driver has to take a lot of back-seat driving from the tank commander who controls him through the tank intercom system. The commander sits several feet above the driver and can see farther and better. Controlling the driver is just another duty for the commander who must also help the gunner look for targets, listen to radio calls, keep the friendly infantry located, check his position on the map and, unless he wants his leg broken, keep out of the way of the gun's recoil. In a fast-moving situation the tank commander is a pretty busy fellow—it's definitely not a job for a nervous, high-strung man.

The line of sight from the commander's hatch prevents him from seeing anyone who is close to the tank. That's why infantry shouldn't walk close to a tank if they can help it. Some men think that close support of a tank means getting right up next to it. That's a good way to get knocked down by the blast of the big gun. When the gun is fired there is a rush of air to the rear and the flank caused by the blast deflector on the gun, which catches part of the powder blast. By deflecting the blast to the side, visibility to the front is improved and the blow-back also helps to reduce the recoil of the gun. The force of the blast can

e tanks

You're the infantryman and you're running the show. But if tanks are involved, heed the advice of the tank commander

knock a man down if he isn't expecting it. And even if he is, the blast can blow his helmet off.

Seldom is it necessary to get next to a tank in furnishing adequate support. A tank can be well covered with fire from 50 to 100 yards away. If enemy should jump upon or get near the tank, blaze away at them immediately. The small-arms fire can't hurt the men inside so don't hesitate for fear of hitting the tank.

There is one safe spot close-in to the tank—directly behind it. If the infantryman stays behind the tank, up close to the hull, he can use the tank-infantry phone with impunity either to talk to the tank commander or to help direct the gunner onto targets.

In referring to targets the infantryman must remember to use the bow of the tank as 12 o'clock. The

and light artillery, the crew is capable of delivering well-aimed direct fire on enemy positions at close range.

Few infantrymen are aware of the accuracy of such fire and are inclined to fear overhead fire from the tank. Remember that the coaxial machine gun is held firmly in place by bolts and clamps hooked onto tons of steel. The dispersion at 700 yards is unbelievably small, and the shooting is very accurate. The 90mm gun is as accurate as a rifle at twice the rifle's effective range. The gunner, peering through his scope, can hit any target on the ground that he can see. If the infantry will learn not to fear overhead fire from a tank and will ask for it whenever possible, fire support will increase in effectiveness and ob-

information on to the tank commander over the tank-infantry phone or the radio.

You've probably heard the old gag, "The target the tanks love best is a group of Boy Scouts after they've completed a hard march." Actually the best targets for tanks are emplacements, other tanks and groups of enemy with small arms. Tanks have a rough time engaging a cleverly concealed anti-tank gun unless the tank spots the AT gun first and can sneak up and get in the first lick.

Always try to spot AT weapons and warn the tank. If the tank finds itself on the receiving end of some high-velocity shells it must make every effort to seek cover immediately and formulate a plan for action. Just as an infantryman on the receiving end of machine-gun fire hits the deck and plans his attack on the



How close is "close" support?

gunner has a traversing indicator beside him which indicates zero when the gun is lined up with the bow of the tank. Therefore, if the infantry passes word of a target, say at two o'clock, the gunner merely traverses right 1,100 mills and searches for the target through his telescope.

On the credit side of the ledger, the tank has some very useful characteristics. Three of these are tactical—armor-protected firepower, battlefield mobility and shock action. The most important of these advantages is the armor-protected firepower. As the tank is impervious to small-arms fire and shell fragments, and can withstand hits from mortars

projectives will be reduced with proportionally less effort.

There is no doubt that tanks have made mistakes and fired on friendly troops, but not very often. The fact that a few mistakes have been made is no reason to keep tanks in the background. Our artillery and planes have also made identical errors but no one ever considers leaving them out of the fire-support picture.

A tank cannot fire while on the move and hope to hit anything. It has to stop while the gunner gets on the target and fires. It is also difficult for the tank commander to pick out targets while the tank is underway, so the infantry must be on the alert for targets and must pass the

weapon opposing him, so must the tank plan to out-maneuver and destroy the AT gun—the tanks deadliest enemy.

If the tank is to carry out its primary mission in combat (aid to the infantry) it must, consistent with its mission of course, make every effort to stay in action. Otherwise the man on the ground may be forced to attack enemy weapons and positions that could be disposed of easily by the tank.

One capability of a tank not fully utilized is its ability to retrieve wounded. The tank does not bounce and jar as much as an ambulance, especially in rough terrain, and it



Up on the ridges — harass with point-blank fire

can move much faster than litter bearers. Tankers hauled wounded from Hagaru to Koto-ri, and by placing the casualties on the warm engine compartments and covering them with blankets they probably saved many from frostbite.

Another good feature of the tank is its ability to carry supplies through fire-swept areas. Many times tanks have carried food, water and ammo to units cut off by fire, and hauled the wounded out safely on the return trip.

In addition to the highly accurate, direct-fire capabilities of the tank, it is also able to perform indirect fire missions. It is usually necessary for artillery to set up well behind

the front lines to avoid being located by the enemy and drawing counter-battery fire. The tank, on the other hand, can move right up on the front lines, or just behind them on a reverse slope, and perform deep fire missions.

In the early stages of the war in Korea tanks were used as artillery in support of the 7th Marines. In registering in, the artillery officer was surprised to learn that the lateral dispersion of the tanks' fire was about 50 percent less than that of the 105s, and the tanks were firing almost five thousand yards beyond the maximum effective range of the light artillery.

The 90mm tank gun, when used

in the manner described above, can reach out further than ordinary light artillery and therefore is a valuable ace-in-the-hole for the commander. By bringing up tanks and giving them harassing and interdiction missions, the commander can wreak havoc on road junctions and assembly areas deep in the enemy's rear.

It seems reasonable to assume that in defensive situations the tanks could be utilized in covering and interdicting all along a division front. Employing tanks in this manner would certainly add to the firepower of the artillery regiment. It is possible that the tanks could be used in the same manner during the attack.

When used in static defensive positions on the front lines, the tanks become armored pillboxes. Emplaced in this manner they can bring accurate fire to bear on any attacking enemy. Although they are blind at night, they can still bring fire to bear on a predetermined area by using a range card like the one used by heavy machine-gun sections. With the aid of the elevation quadrant and the gunner's quadrant the gunner can interdict a specified area whether he can see it or not.

Tanks also can serve as rallying points in the case of a breakthrough. The crew buttons-up and continues fighting in an effort to break up an attack. The enemy may swarm all over the tank, but if they cannot penetrate the armor their efforts will be futile. In the meantime the tanks can be busy cutting down enemy reinforcements, keeping them from ex-



The one safe place . . . the phone's there too

ploiting the breakthrough.

During daylight hours, however, it is not the best policy to place tanks on the front lines unless it is known that the enemy artillery and AT fire is ineffective. When tanks are dug in they immediately lose two of their tactical characteristics—mobility and shock action. Therefore, it is wise to keep the tanks in rear of the front lines during daylight hours so that they can be maneuvered readily from one spot to another to counter-attack or to deliver surprise fire.

This system of surprise fire was used with success in Korea. The Marines would allow the Chinese to build elaborate emplacements and occupy them. Then the tanks would run up to the front lines, reduce the targets to rubble and then withdraw

to await new targets of opportunity.

Getting back to the primary mission of the tank, there are at least three factors the infantry commander who desires support for patrols should consider.

Is the enemy strong in AT guns? Has he been using mines extensively? Is the terrain suitable for extended deployment of the tanks?

To send tanks into an area known to be covered by AT guns is plain suicide unless the positions of the guns are definitely known. To send tanks into a mined area invites disaster and is uneconomical unless there are enough remunerative targets to make the possible tank casualties worthwhile. Finally, to send tanks down a narrow defile or road to search for targets again in-

vites disaster. When the terrain restricts the tanks to a road, all the enemy has to do is knock out the last tank and then pick off the rest at leisure. A narrow defile limits the lateral dispersion of the tanks and restricts their ability to seek cover from AT guns which might be employed to bring plunging fire to bear. Also, in the latter case, tanks are restricted in the amount of elevation that can be used on the guns.

If the target is high up on a hill and the tank is forced to stay close to the hill, it may not be able to engage the target. In Korea such an incident occurred. The infantry leader demanded that the tanks follow him across a stream to aid in the attack on a hill position. The tank leader explained, in vain, that it would be better for the tanks to stay away from the hill—better supporting fire could be delivered from a distance. The infantryman was adamant, however, and the tanks had to move with the infantry. As a result, the tanks wound up in a position where it was impossible for the guns to elevate sufficiently to cover the assigned area.



AT guns can spell suicide

INFANTRY AND TANK leaders alike must understand that tanks are as versatile as imagination makes them. The tank-infantry team is a great fighting combination, but it is only as good as its state of training. A thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of tanks is indispensable to the infantry leader if he expects to get the most from his tank-infantry fighting combination. Of course, there are two sides to the question. The infantry leader who doesn't know tanks should depend on the tank commander's knowledge and recommendations. On the other hand, the tank officer should be more tolerant of the decisions made by infantry leaders and try to help them in every way.

An intelligent approach to the problem is intensive training. I know of no better way to teach the infantry officers the fundamentals of tanks than to assign them to a tank unit for a week or two and let them act as part of the crew.

Another approach might be more intensive training in tank capabilities for Basic School students. Give

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Field day for tankers — rolling country, good cover and targets

students time to study the tank inside and out. Let them operate the turret, fire the guns and operate the radio. Give them more instruction on terrain as it pertains to the operation of a tank. In all, give the new officer a clearer picture of what the tank can and can't do.

We could use a tank school for Marine officers—Quantico would be the ideal spot. At Camp Lejeune the terrain is impossible. Tanks there are relatively road-bound. There just isn't any varied terrain to test driving skill, and the training areas are inadequate for schooling gunners and tank commanders in range estimation.

At Quantico we already have the basis for a tank school. Schools Demonstration Troops has a large,

new tank park and several tanks of different makes. Officers who have been with the infantry long enough to establish themselves as infantry platoon leaders could be sent to Quantico for assignment with this tank unit. And working out with it in the various types of missions the unit performs, the officers would receive training which would qualify them for future assignments with one of the divisions. I believe infantry officers should get first consideration because they are familiar with infantry work and would tend to be more understanding of the infantry's need of tanks in combat.

In addition, such a school would familiarize officers with the Marine Corps' tank tactics. The Armored School at Fort Knox is excellent for

Army officers, but it does not have quite the same value for Marines. The Army teaches fundamentals of huge armor thrusts deep into enemy territory, or the use of fast armored units operating on the flanks or point miles from the main body. Training of this type is ideal for Army officers, but Marines are more interested in the tank-infantry concept where the pace of the movement is set by the man on foot.

In summary, better education on the capabilities and limitations of tanks, coupled with a more realistic and detailed approach to tank-infantry training, will increase the combat effectiveness of the tank-infantry team. And the Marine Corps will become an even more potent fighting machine. US & MC

in brief

Two of the most coveted trophies (below) awarded by the Organized Marine Corps Reserve will spend 1954 in the trophy room of "Boston's Own" 2d Infantry Bn. The battalion was awarded the Joseph Vittori Trophy, and the Woman Marine Classification Platoon attached to the battalion won the Katherine A. Towle Trophy. Both trophies are presented annually for the highest percentage of attendance at field training held regularly each year.





An anesthesia "space helmet" for Junior has been developed by Navy doctors. Designed to rid children of the fears normally associated with taking anesthesia, the helmet was first tried out by four-year-old Jimmy Bowden shown above with one of the inventors, Lieutenant Morrow, (MC) United States Navy.

Launched minus her power plant, the Navy's first atomic submarine, the USS Nautilus will begin sea trials next summer.

Another series of nuclear weapons tests is to be staged in the Marshall Islands "sometime in the future," according to the Atomic Energy Commission. The experiments will represent "a further phase of a continuing series of weapons of all categories," the AEC said.

Latest all-weather fighter to be accepted by the Navy is the McDonnell F3H Demon (right). Designed for carrier and land operations, the single-jet plane combines interceptor speed and fighter maneuverability with the payload of an attack bomber. All-weather operations are made possible by a new, improved type of radar device and the latest developments in computing and fire-control equipment.






Escape techniques from sunken submarines have been added to the training curriculum of members of the 1st Provisional Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance Group in Hawaii. At left, members of the group become acquainted with the Momson Lung at Pearl Harbor's submarine base.

All regulations, dates and eligibility rules for rifle and pistol competition for the calendar year 1954 have been published by HQMC in Marine Corps Memorandum 79-53.

The Navy-Chance Vought Regulus guided missile (below) rolls to a stop at Murdoc, California, after a training mission in launching and guiding techniques. The combat version will trade wheels and parachute for an atomic warhead.




Five Marines, former POWs of the Communists in Korea, have been decorated by Secretary of the Navy Robert B. Anderson (right). The Marines were cited for exemplary conduct in resisting Communist indoctrination despite torture. Secretary Anderson is shown pinning the Letter of Commendation Ribbon on MSgt John T. Cain, an enlisted pilot. Looking on are the other four recipients: (left to right) LtCol W. G. Thrash (Gold Star in lieu of second Legion of Merit); LtCol J. N. McLaughlin (Legion of Merit); Major W. R. Harris (Legion of Merit); and Captain J. P. Flynn, Jr. (Navy-Marine Corps Medal). These awards were the first to be made to POWs returned from Korea.



A new transport helicopter, developed for the Marine Corps by Sikorsky Aircraft Co., has no trouble "swallowing" three Mighty-Mite jeeps or 26 men with full combat gear (above and back cover). Believed to be the first helicopter with retractable landing gear, the huge craft's top speed is in excess of 150 miles per hour. New features besides the retractable gear include a five-bladed front rotor (the rear rotor has four blades), automatic pilot and de-icing equipment. Official designation of the 'copter: XHR2S.

the Anti-Bandit War

By Col J. C. Murray



Courtesy LIFE
(c) TIME Inc.

Communist leader "General" Markos Vafiades



Under Papagos the Army was made to do what it was capable of doing—no more was needed to gain victory



Acme

**Field Marshal Alexander Papagos,
Commander-in-chief Greek Army**

Synopsis:

The campaign began with the murder of isolated officials and the beating or threatening of right-wing citizens of prominence. Next came attacks on small villages and on larger Gendarmerie detachments. Then, in 1947, the bandits began to try to hold certain areas to protect their supply routes and they played their trump card—the establishment of the "Provisional Democratic Government."

Opposing each other in the conflict were two vastly different forces. The Greek Government troops, numbering 265,000 by the end of the war, received material aid and military advice from the United States and Britain, and in the final campaigns were able to make use of supporting arms. The guerrillas, on the other hand, never stronger than 20,000, operated solely as light infantry with little support from artillery and mortars.

But the contest was not as one-sided as it appears. It took time for the Greek Government to organize its army into a cohesive fighting force. The guerrillas, lightly equipped and unimpeded by service units or territorial responsibility, had good mobility in a tactical sense and a high degree of flexibility. Every man was a fighter and the bands had no soft rear.

As long as the guerrillas tailored their tactics to the forces and arms at their disposal, they held the whip hand. But when they tried to hold ground and protect their supply routes they were doomed to failure.

Part III COMBAT EFFICIENCY

THE TERM "COMBAT EFFICIENCY" as used here embraces such factors as training, command and staff functioning, discipline and morale.

Any judgment on the training of the "Democratic Army" depends upon the frame of reference. By orthodox standards it was deficient in almost every respect. Obviously, however, such standards are not appropriate. Guerrilla warfare has been little rationalized by the armies of duly established governments. For example, until recently the U. S. Army Field Service Regulations devoted only eight paragraphs to the subject. Historically, guerrilla warfare has been a practical art largely rebuilt from the ground up wherever the need for it arose. In recent years it has been embraced by international Communism as a tactic of revolution, and the employment of partisan

warfare by the forces of international Communism will in time foster more effective anti-guerrilla doctrine.

In Greece the "Democratic Army" did not have to start from the beginning in the development of its tactics. It was able to draw upon a vast reservoir of practical experience. Many of its leaders had served with ELAS during the occupation, but a higher standard of partisan warfare had been developed under Tito in Yugoslavia. The new Yugoslav Army had many expert partisan warriors. The guerrillas of Greece benefited from their experience.

Evidence was presented to the United Nations Commission Concerning Frontier Incidents that picked men from the refugees, who fled across the border following the abortive revolution in Greece, were trained in guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia and Albania. In Yugoslavia, Slav-speaking Greeks were attached directly to the Army for training. The Commission examined copies of military manuals in the Greek language used for theoretical and practical training in guerrilla warfare in both Yugoslavia and Albania. Finally, it was reported that prior to the formation of the "Government of Free Greece" General Nadj, a Yugo-

slav expert in guerrilla warfare, directed guerrilla operations from Skoplje.

Commanders

Guerrilla leaders, then, were not without theoretical training in guerrilla warfare, but there were few theorists among them. They were practical soldiers selected for their ability to get things done. Failure was accepted as evidence of incompetence and the leader who failed was replaced. The tempo of operations was such that an incompetent leader was soon exposed.

If the leaders were qualified by training and experience in guerrilla warfare, they were less so for orthodox warfare. The evolution towards a strategy which depended upon the formation of larger units and upon the adoption of conventional military tactics, tended to deprive the "Democratic Army" of leadership adequate to its requirements.

Fighters

The training of the fighter varied between wide limits. Some were as well qualified as regards training as the leaders; that is, experience in ELAS, training in the satellites and experience in the field. Others fell far short of this, particularly toward

the end of the war. Training in the satellites was continued for new recruits, but the journey there was long and oftentimes impracticable. Thus training was given locally in loosely organized training centers, and some recruits received their only training in the bands themselves. This training was minimal, ranging downward from two months to almost nothing. For example, recruits taken at Kardhitsa were given only 15 days training prior to their participation in the attack on Karpension. Since much of the time was devoted to political indoctrination, military training could have included little more than the elements of fieldcraft and basic weapons instruction. Perhaps the best and most extensive training came from association with veterans on the job. The guerrilla who survived became battle-wise.

Policy problems of the guerrillas and their influence on morale

If the impression has been created that the policy and strategy of the Communists was firm and steadfast at all times, it has been unintentional. While a detailed analysis of guerrilla leadership and guerrilla morale is scarcely practicable, some indication of the confusion which beset the guerrillas' efforts can be given. Perhaps an outline of the Macedonian problem is the best starting point, as this issue was chronic.

The Macedonian issue

For centuries the area denoted by the name Macedonia has been torn by racial strife. The Turks ruled the area for hundreds of years. Toward the end of the 19th century Serb, Bulgar and Greek fought for control of the awakening political consciousness of the heterogeneous groups inhabiting the area. After the Balkan wars brought the end of Turkish rule, noticeable minority viewpoints of the various groups continued to exist. When, during World War II, the occupation of Yugoslavia brought Bulgarian troops into Macedonia they were not necessarily unwelcomed. The Bulgarians, however, began to alienate the newly acquired areas by a policy of denationalization.

Tito, leader of the Communist partisan movement in Yugoslavia, saw an opportunity for Communism to make capital from this reaction

His sister trained in Albania to fight him in Greece

Wide World



to Bulgar policy. Tito's view that the exploitation of the Macedonian problem should be undertaken by his party did not find immediate favor with the Comintern. That body felt that since this area had been partially occupied by Bulgarian troops, it should more properly be worked by Bulgarian Communists. However, as the Yugoslav party achieved such striking results elsewhere, the Comintern revised its decision and entrusted developments in the area to the Yugoslav Communists.

Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo was directed by Tito to take charge. His program was simple. The Communist Party would identify itself with "Macedonian nationalism." Macedonia would become one of the autonomous republics of a new federal Yugoslavia, or, as was sometimes vaguely hinted, a full independent state. It would include territory of Greece, Bulgaria, as well as Yugoslavia. Moscow approved. Tito's power was growing and some of the peoples of the area accepted the idea with enthusiasm.

In the spring of 1943 agreement on joint action between Yugoslav and Greek partisans in certain areas was worked out, but difficulties developed regarding the Slav minority along the border. Their loyalty was uncertain. When the Bulgars overran the area in rear of the German Army, these Slavs had discovered themselves to be good Bulgars. This brought them many advantages. In contrast to their Greek neighbors, they became not subject people but liberated brothers. But in the spring of 1943 the wind was changing. The Allies were tightening their grip on the eastern Mediterranean and Tito's partisan movement had a program for a united Macedonia under Soviet auspices. Perhaps this held a more promising future.

The Greek Communist attitude toward the Macedonian issue

Greek Communist leaders anticipated this transformation with mixed feelings. The more nationally-minded Greeks could not forgive the Slav minorities for their early espousal of the Bulgars, and viewed their conversion to the resistance with distrust. Was a Communist Yugoslav Imperialism any better for Greece than Bulgar Fascism? Never-

theless, the Yugoslavs urged the formation of Slav detachments with their own commanders under the general direction of ELAS. If ELAS did not succeed, the Slav detachments could be withdrawn to Yugoslavia to prepare for the thrust that would detach Greek Macedonia from Greece and bring it under Yugoslav control. That the Greek Communists would ever agree to such crippling loss of strategic territory, or be sufficiently loyal to the international revolutionary movement to bear the odium of advocating such an unpopular move was doubtful.

The satellites unite on the Macedonian issue

In time Tito became the undisputed ruler of re-united Yugoslavia. Enver Hodja in Albania became his protégé. Dimitrov took control in Bulgaria. Having the mutual bond of Communism, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria buried old differences and reached a common policy on Macedonia. Bulgaria would support a Greater Macedonia as a part of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia would support Bulgaria's claim to Thrace in exchange for the latter's loss of Bulgarian Macedonia.

Guerrilla leadership is adjusted to "international" view

Meanwhile the Communist Party in Greece did not fare well. Having led its followers into the abortive revolution of December 1944, it had no alternative but to apply to Communists in the satellite neighbors for support. Asylum, supplies and training were provided the refugees from Greece. Direction of the Communist Party in Greece remained in Greek hands, however, until May 1947. At that time control was suddenly taken over by satellite personnel.

These changes occurred concurrently with the advent of U. S. interest in Greece. They suggest recognition by the Cominform that the Greek Communist Party was not an adequate instrument and that success in the guerrilla war demanded that direction be passed to other hands.

By virtue of their geographical position, this task naturally fell to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.

The assumption of power in the Greek Communist Party by satellite



Wide World

Leader of a guerrilla band

personnel also constituted a settlement between nationalism and internationalism in the Greek Communist hierarchy. Greeks whose nationalism prevented a genuine international approach to the problem were eliminated from positions of influence. Thus party leadership could work with equal facility for the control of Greece or for the detachment of Macedonia from Greece.

Since General Markos, who became commander of the "Democratic Army" in December 1946, was unaffected by these changes, it can be assumed that he was in harmony with developments.

Influence of peace offensives of USSR

The policy problems of the guerrilla leadership were not exclusively local in character. Greece was a microcosm in which were duplicated to some extent the developments in the macrocosm of East-West relations. Thus, on occasion, the guerrilla line was brought into harmony with sporadic Soviet efforts to appear reasonable. On 10 September 1947 General Markos put forward terms on which he was "prepared to come to an understanding." Again in June 1948, Bulgaria indicated a desire to resume negotiations with Greece. Albania stated that relations with

Tito was read out of the Cominform as a deviationist. The development, however, appeared to have no immediate effect upon the guerrilla war. Tito, though standing his ground firmly, was attempting a reconciliation with the Cominform. He had nothing to gain by alienating it further by precipitate action in the Greek matter. Possibly he may even have entertained the idea of continuing to support the guerrilla war on his own initiative in the interest of Yugoslav Communism. As for the leaders in Greece, they awaited developments. Word went out to the bands that there was to be

4 February, General Markos and others of the guerrilla leadership "resigned." It is not clear whether Markos resigned voluntarily because of Yugoslavia's growing detachment or whether he was forced out.

One version is that a decision was taken at a General Assembly in the Vitsi area to form an Independent Macedonia to include all or a portion of Yugoslav Macedonia. Thus an autonomous Macedonia, which had been Tito's inspiration, was to be turned against him. Markos and others opposed this development and advocated that the "Democratic Army" reorganize into small groups to carry on a war for which guerrillas were suited. As a result they were removed from power and placed under detention. Inasmuch as many of the guerrillas were followers of Markos, the report was circulated that his removal resulted from illness.

In this fashion did the guerrilla movement adjust itself to the Tito-Cominform rift, control passing to Cominform-oriented leaders as opposed to those oriented toward Yugoslavia. Yugoslav assistance grew less until July, when Tito announced the closing of the frontier. Meanwhile, the Cominform attempted to direct the guerrilla war through Albania and Bulgaria with increased participation of other satellites, but the key position which had been Yugoslavia's could not be filled. Moreover, if Tito's influence in the "Democratic Government" had been purged, the Cominform was unable to penetrate Yugoslav Macedonia. The Slavo-Macedonian Army expected to spring into life as a result of the Cominform indorsement of an Independent Macedonia did not materialize. Greek reaction, too, was unfavorable. The leadership might be internationalist in its views, but there was wide discontent with this idea among the rank and file.

Guerrilla morale

That changes in policy and leadership of this magnitude could have failed to affect the morale of the "Democratic Army" seems most unlikely. There are in the sum of its efforts indications that it was motivated by a kind of desperation rather than a conviction of urgent, immediate, historical purposefulness. And yet it kept going. The answer



INP

Partisans — the troops were kept in the dark

Greece could be improved. The propaganda line shifted from bitter attacks against the Army to a plaint that persecutions inspired in Greece by the U. S. must halt. Zachariades, leading Greek Communist and rigid adherent of the Moscow line, reappeared at the headquarters of the "Government of Free Greece" and the Markos Junta launched a peace offensive, broadcasting offers to negotiate peace terms. This was in June, however, and the return of Zachariades and Yugoslavia's omission from the peace offensive were indications of what was in the wind.

Tito-Cominform rift, guerrilla leadership re-adjusted

In July an event took place which must have seemed little short of catastrophic to the guerrilla leaders.

no discussion concerning Tito or his relations with the Cominform or with banditry.

Tito's efforts at reconciliation met no success. There was no advantage to him in continuing to support the bandit war in the interests of the Cominform, and it was becoming evident to him that he could not do it in his own interests. Not only were his resources required at home now that he could no longer get supplies from the USSR, but he could use assistance from the West in any prolonged struggle with the Cominform. Such help would not be forthcoming so long as he aided the guerrillas. Yugoslav aid to the guerrillas waned. By January 1949 supplies from Yugoslavia had fallen off to a mere trickle. A few weeks later, on

lies in the strict discipline of the Communist leaders and the fact that the "fighters" were kept in ignorance of developments.

For example, the removal of Markos, which signaled the elimination of Yugoslav influence in the guerrilla movement, aroused only an undercurrent of dissatisfaction without troublesome activity on the part of Markos' adherents. The great mass of the guerrillas was carried along by the leaders and by a deluge of propaganda concealing adverse developments or rationalizing them in the light of the party line.

There were two orders of morale among the guerrillas. The first was the morale of the hard-core Communist. Initially, a high proportion of the guerrillas were of this cast, but with the increase of forced recruiting there arose a morale problem. The morale of the forced recruit, while not necessarily low, was of a different order. It depended upon the amount of his political indoctrination. When possible the new recruit was sent across the borders for indoctrination. When this could not be done, his indoctrination was carried out in Greece. This training being incomplete, continuous propaganda had to be carried on within the bands in order to keep up morale. More time was spent in this type of activity than in military training. A good percentage of forced recruits responded favorably to indoctrination, but few became zealots.

Beginning early in 1949 the opportunities for the indoctrination of recruits decreased sharply because of the increasing aggressiveness of the Army which kept guerrilla units on the move. The new, limited training was scarcely adequate to convert a forced recruit into a hardened guerrilla who could endure the rigors of guerrilla life without complaint. As 1949 wore on the leaders had more and more difficulty in maintaining morale. By July, probably the majority of the 18,500 guerrillas would have surrendered if given a chance; and by the time of the Vitsi and Grammos battles, guerrilla morale was at the lowest ebb since the start of the war.

The Greek National Army

Those who are inclined to regard the Greek Army with tolerance for

its early showing in the anti-guerrilla war would do well to turn back the pages to the year 1940. The results attained in six months of combat with the Italian Army afford a striking manifestation of combat efficiency. Factors which went into it were:

A well-trained regular Army as a nucleus for expansion.

Trained reserves.

Competent commanders and staff officers.

High national morale, universal and unstinting public support and outstanding combat esprit.

These factors were dissipated in the period between the Greco-Italian war and the war with the guerrillas.

Unlike the Navy, which withdrew from Greece during the occupation and acquired valuable experience in the Mediterranean, the Army was unable to withdraw and was forced to surrender in Greece, following which it was dissolved. A Greek Army of the Middle East was formed in Egypt but few Army personnel were able to join it. The force was so small that few officers received training or experience of value. Moreover, the force was not well-disciplined and it saw combat only at El Alamein and Rimini. Consequently, from April 1941 to the summer of 1945, the Greek Army (for all practical purposes) was non-existent and during this time much of its know-how was dissipated.

An Army dissolved for four years is not rebuilt in a day, and efforts started in 1945 did not progress rapidly. Early efforts were devoted primarily to administrative matters—the activation of units, procurement and issue of uniforms, weapons and equipment, the recovery and restoration of facilities and the re-establishment of services. Training proceeded slowly and the guerrilla activity of the fall of 1946 found an Army unprepared for active operations. In an effort to speed up training and to provide small units specially trained in anti-guerrilla warfare, the British Military Mission pushed the formation of Commando units, but even this program moved slowly.

In April 1947 the Army started its first large-scale offensive, and from that time onward its units were so engaged that training was thought to be impracticable. Moreover, there was on the part of officers, who had



Wide World

As forced recruiting increased, guerrilla morale went down

long been deprived of command responsibility or who had it thrust upon them without adequate preparation, a lack of appreciation of the importance of training, particularly in the units. There was a tendency to feel that training within a unit which had already seen active combat entailed a loss of face for the unit and its personnel. This indifference to unit training was not discouraged by the policies of the British Military Mission.

His Majesty's Government, which gave support to the legal government of Greece in December 1944, was criticized sharply for its "intervention" in Greek affairs. Thereafter it became sensitive to further involvement. It would supply the Army, advise it on technical and organizational matters and assist in the training at training centers, but it would not risk giving operational advice or the attachment of advisors to field units. Consequently, little unit or field training was conducted until the fall of 1948 when it was initiated under the aegis of the U. S. Mission.

The British Military Mission did assist at training centers and schools where basic individual and technical training was given. Unfortunately, the Army had been formed so rapidly that few of its personnel had bene-

fited from such training. The fact that the first call-ups were old reservists who had had basic training prior to the war mitigated this circumstance. While this was an advantage initially, it subsequently became a disadvantage. These "old" reservists were found to be ineffective in field service.

In the spring of 1948 there was no plan by which these older men could be replaced by younger men. In fact, the prevailing manpower ceiling left no space for the training of replacements. To meet this situation a temporary increase of 15,000 was approved. In order to get the greatest possible amount of new blood during the period of the increase, the length of recruit training was reduced from 17 to eight, and finally six weeks. This was entirely inadequate, considering that little training could be expected once these men reported to their units. By the end of October, nearly 50,000 of these half-trained replacements had been distributed to the combat units.

It may be said, then, that the level of training in the Army never exceeded individual training; and that as the older reserves were replaced, the level of individual training was becoming less satisfactory. In view of this, interest developed in the previously neglected field of unit training. To stop the war to improve training was not to be considered, but some things could be done to alleviate the situation without interfering unduly with the course of planned operations. In July 1948 a training section was established in the U. S. Military Mission to encourage unit training.

Government forces—to train after combat was to lose face



The initial program was not far-reaching, nor was it particularly effective. Its greatest value lay in its recognition of the problem. Eight demonstration platoons were formed. These were trained in the presentation of section and platoon combat problems. A platoon was then assigned to each of the Army divisions. There it presented its demonstrations to units of the division as operations permitted. Following the presentation of this series of tactical exercises, the sections and platoons of the unit under training repeated them. Frequently the time allowed was insufficient, but most of the units had completed the exercises in one form or another prior to the opening of the final campaign.

At the end of the revitalization program, recruit training was extended to 17 weeks. Thus the need for small-unit training in field units was no longer urgent, and in the summer of 1949 the hitherto neglected field of company and battalion exercises was opened up. Such units as could be spared were made available for this training which was conducted with the assistance of U. S. field teams. Accomplishments were limited because of operational commitments in preparation for the August offensive. However, the groundwork was laid for more extensive field training following the successful conclusion of the campaign.

This survey gives an indication of the state of training which was reflected in the Army's combat efficiency. It would be incorrect to leave the impression that the limited ventures in unit and field training

made during the last year of the war made a significant contribution to victory. Infantry still performed less efficiently than could be desired at the attack in Vitsi in August 1949. However, the efforts were of value. The Greek has an active and inquiring mind and, if he is made to see the value of something, he is not slow in adopting it. The efforts of the field teams, arousing the interest of the soldiers, combined with the command interest which led to the acceptance of the program to persuade the Army as a whole that training was important. Returns on this program will be found in the present and future efficiency of the Army.


Leadership and morale

As the Army enjoyed a superiority of 10 to 1 in men and materials, its prolonged inability to eliminate the guerrillas raises a question as to the quality of its direction. Was the ineffectiveness of the Army the result of failure of commanders to employ effectively the forces placed at their disposal? Did the absence of effective leadership prolong the war? To some extent these questions must be answered in the affirmative. A lack of competent and aggressive commanders plagued the Army in 1947 and 1948. A comparatively low standard of professional training was not the only cause of command failures. Important too were a certain lack of discipline and the absence of a strong "will to fight."

Non-military influences in the Army

In some countries effective constitutional barriers have been established between military power and domestic politics. Others have been less successful in this respect. Greece has been among the latter. Personal relationships between individual military officers and political leaders were not uncommon, and many military officers had channels bypassing the Army command and the War Ministry through which they could reach the Government. Moreover, the Army command, which owed its tenure to the Government, could not disregard the wishes of the political figures who made it up. Thus, the military command's control over the Army tended to be circumscribed by political considerations.

These non-military influences af-



Courtesy LIFE (c) TIME Inc.

Protection of villages dissipated Army's strength

fect Army efficiency during the early stages of the anti-bandit war. Incompetent officers could not be discharged without governmental action, and this was difficult to obtain. Attempts to remove officers were projected into the realm of politics where they were not susceptible of a sound solution. The inability of the Army to remove incompetent and insubordinate officers tended to destroy respect for authority. Subordinate commanders occasionally disregarded orders, confident that no great misfortune would accrue to them through their failure to obey. To the habit of half-measures in the execution of field orders which prevailed in 1947 and 1948, may be attributed some of the Army's lack of success.

Political influences also affected the conduct of operations. Following the unsuccessful 1947 campaign, the Army was forced by political pressure to disperse its forces to provide protection for various towns and villages. This dispersion of the Army in static garrisons left the guerrilla free to roam unmolested. When the Army attempted to order units into the field or to concentrate them for major operations, protests

were sometimes made by political representatives from the areas from which the protection was being stripped. These protests came down on the War Ministry and on several occasions brought the cancellation of planned operations. The effect of this upon the conduct of the war can scarcely be over-estimated. The guerrillas could have been eliminated by continuous pressure, but this pressure could not be exerted by troops disposed for static defense. The Army did not escape this predicament until the National Defense Corps was formed.

Had a calculated risk with respect to the civil community been accepted while the Army went after the bandits, they could have been run to earth very much earlier. It is significant that the NDC—formed to free the Army from defensive duties—was itself progressively relieved from such duties as soon as Army offensives reduced the capabilities of the guerrillas. In effect, the NDC became a 50,000 increase in the strength of the Army. Had firm military direction over the Army been established at an earlier date, this increase might not have been required.

Professional shortcomings in commanders and staff officers

An Army's most valuable asset is the professional education of its officer corps. This asset, which is subject to dissipation just as are the other assets of the Army, is the most difficult to recover. It is a matter not of months but of years.

The professional officers of the pre-war period were not numerous. Many of them became casualties in the wars with Italy and Germany. Many good officers made themselves unacceptable after the liberation because of their association with the Communist-controlled ELAS forces. Most of the remaining officers were separated from their profession and from the responsibilities of command for more than four years. Thus the Army needed a period of time to re-establish its officer corps. This it was not granted. The Army was called upon to take the field even before it was fully organized. There were, therefore, shortcomings in professional qualifications among commanders and staff officers which tended to reduce the effectiveness of the Army in its earlier operations. These were manifest in insufficient recognition and application of the basic principles of war. For example, the initiative was not always stressed. It was not always understood that decisive results could be obtained only by offensive action. The principle of economy of force as regards static garrisons was long neglected. The importance of surprise was not always appreciated, and reconnaissance and security measures were often slighted. The tactical integrity of troop units was not always respected and there were numerous instances of piece-mealing of forces in formations which had no adequate mechanism of control and no recognizable chain of command, hence no command responsibility. Adequate reserves were not always maintained. Co-ordination between units frequently left much to be desired, and units were sometimes permitted to drift into action without a clear-cut plan.

Less than optimum effectiveness, in the use of military staffs in exercising the responsibilities of command, sometimes resulted from inadequate understanding of staff principles and organization. Avail-



Wide World

An army's greatest asset — professionally competent officers

able intelligence was not always used in the preparation of plans. Combat information was not always disseminated both vertically and laterally. Combat orders were sometimes vague and indefinite and subject to multiple interpretation. Finally, staff officers were often assigned collateral duties of such nature as to limit effective performance of their primary duties.

In the field of administration, the responsibility of command as regards the comfort and welfare of the individual soldier was not sufficiently stressed. There was a tendency to neglect supply and maintenance discipline.

The "will to fight"

A factor which contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Army, along with the state of its training and deficiencies in the professional qualifications of its officer corps, in the earlier effort, was the lack of a strong "will to fight." This lack of offensive spirit, which was compounded of many elements, fed upon itself. Prolonged lack of success developed a sense of frustration and futility. The Army came to believe that it was engaged in a Sisyphean task. The same operations were repeated again and again, and there was no end in sight. What was the good of sacrificing men and effort in a bold attack to seize an ob-

jective, when it was certain that the same objective would have to be taken again next month or next year? This feeling of hopelessness reached its nadir, when thoughts of victory, engendered by the early success of the 1948 campaign, were dashed to the ground by the guerrilla defense of the Vitsi area. Another year of war had passed and the end was no nearer. The situation appeared no better than at the start of the campaign.

This malignant thing received nourishment from other sources. Among them was the lack of discipline. The habit of questioning orders, which was mentioned earlier, affected the Army's confidence in its command and leadership. A spirit of indecision was fostered which militated against decisive action. To take decisive action involves the acceptance of risks. A miscalculation may result in failure and censure. Since the bandits seldom attacked a large military formation, a commander who temporized reduced his chances of making an error. The inaction of a commander might have disastrous effects upon a campaign, but if there were no errors of commission on his part, it was difficult to proceed against him. Consequently, the commanders sometimes showed a tendency to wait for the guerrillas to call the cues. Failure to take the initiative produced fear of

the enemy's capabilities and weakened confidence on the part of the Army as to its own capabilities. This lack of complete self-confidence led the Army to waver in its belief of ultimate victory.

This weakening of confidence in ultimate victory was not confined to the narrow field of military operations. It extended into the wider field where the objective was the establishment of security and economic well-being for the people of Greece. The Communists had succeeded in creating a situation under which the Government's effectiveness was hampered. If the Government was incapable of consolidating such gains as the Army might make, why go on with it? Why make fruitless sacrifices? Why not "peace at any price" now, instead of later?

The soldier who had less than confidence in the ultimate outcome had personal grievances which reduced his offensive spirit. The original call-ups were reservists of the older classes who fought in the war with Italy. As there was for a long time no replacement program, these men had no prospect of relief—only a vista of a succession of military operations until they stopped a bullet or stepped on a mine. Quite apart from the soldier's feeling that he was being called upon to risk life and limb while younger men watched from the sidelines, was his concern for his family. Many of these older men were married and their pay was so low that their families lived on the verge of starvation.

Finally, there were some active Communists in the Army and a widespread tolerance of varying degrees of Communist ideologies. Economic conditions in Greece produced many dissatisfied citizens. Communist teachings, once driven underground by Metaxas, gained considerable currency during the occupation and resistance. Many soldiers and even officers were mildly tolerant of Communist ideologies and possibly even sympathetic toward the guerrilla cause. To evaluate this factor one must recall that the issue between Soviet expansionist Communism and Democracy had not been clearly defined. By gaining control of the resistance movement during World War II, the Communists had identified themselves with the defense of Greece. Thus they had



King Paul visits the front

gained as adherents many patriotic Greeks. It would take time for them to recognize the changed situation—that the guerrillas no longer fought for Greece and freedom, but for the Kremlin and slavery.

The weakened offensive spirit, product of these many factors, manifested itself in commanders in a disinclination to come to real grips with the enemy. In the soldier, it resulted in the degeneration of the battle into a protracted long-range fire fight from which the guerrilla was able to disengage at will. There was no real effort to close with him to secure his destruction. The net result was indecisive action.

The appointment of General Papagos as Commander-in-Chief

Efforts made by the British and American Missions prior to 1949 to persuade the Government to give the Army a free rein in the conduct of operations, and to encourage the Army to take more aggressive action were not too productive. It was not until the dark weeks of the Vitsi stalemate of 1948, when national morale dropped to an all-time low, that the Government took a substantial step to improve the situation. In October, Prime Minister Sophoulis wrote General Alexander Papagos proposing that he accept supreme command of the Greek land forces.

General Papagos, although holding an honorary appointment in the Court, was in military retirement at the time. Prior to World War II he had been Chief of the Army General Staff. Upon Greece's involvement in that war he became Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In this capacity he had directed the Army in the war against Italy. The German occupation of Greece and his imprisonment

in Germany deprived the general, until a later date, of a full measure of recognition for this service. Nevertheless, his military reputation was established and he was universally respected as a patriot.

General Papagos did not immediately accept the Government's proposal. He replied that he could do so only if certain conditions were accepted by the Government. These provisions included, among other things, the establishment of his jurisdiction as Commander-in-Chief with power to direct operations, to decide all matters pertaining to military organization and to post and transfer officers. He was to have the right to recall to active duty any retired officer, whereas no retired officers were to be recalled without his approval. The Government, after long debate, accepted these provisos.

The instances where it is possible to put a finger on leadership and its value in a crisis are rarer than military histories would have us believe; the role of the commander is often exaggerated. But Papagos had qualifications which were needed at this time. Having refused to accept the post as Commander-in-Chief until far-reaching commitments as to his authority had been made, he was in a position to exert a firm direction on the conduct of military operations. Such direction was needed at this time to exploit fully the many favorable factors in the situation which had been created by U. S. assistance, the falling out of Tito and the Cominform, and the increasing recognition of the true nature of the guerrilla war in Greece.

No development could have been more fortuitous than the appointment of Papagos. Improvements in

the effectiveness of the Army were already underway and the beginnings of decisive action were noticeable. However, it was Papagos who consolidated these gains and brought the Army to the fruition of its potentialities. He restored discipline in the Army by the ruthless removal of unsuitable officers. He stressed aggressive action and ordered the Greek Armed Forces into a series of offensive operations which deprived the guerrilla of the initiative and afforded him no respite. He gave the guerrillas no opportunity to recruit replacements for increasing battle casualties, but harried them until they were driven from Greece.

Under Papagos the Army was galvanized into action. Its manpower was not increased, its training was not greatly improved and there was no significant increase in its equipment. The Army was simply made to do what it was capable of doing, and no more than this was then needed to gain the victory. Seven months after the appointment of Papagos as Commander-in-Chief the war was at an end.

Contributions of U. S. and British Military Missions

Through the appointment of Papagos, the advisory functions of the U. S. and British Military Missions came into their own as a means of increasing the efficiency of the Army. The missions provided a mechanism by which faults in the Army down to division level could be brought to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, along with impartial advice and recommendations for improvements. The value of the missions depended not only upon their acceptance but upon the ability of the Commander-in-Chief to implement their recommendations. Papagos had, prior to his appointment, sought to restrict the influence of the missions. However, following his appointment he gave every indication of appreciating the value of their services. Moreover, unlike his predecessors he was capable of implementing their recommendations. His success was due in no small part to the manner in which he accepted the advice and recommendations of the U. S. and British Missions, and made full use of them. US MC

(To be continued next month)

passing in review

BOOKS OF
INTEREST TO
OUR READERS

A Famous Expedition...

THE JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK—Bernard De Voto, 504 pages, illustrated with maps. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. \$6.50

The Journals of Lewis and Clark is a condensation of the notes kept on the famous expedition. The book includes about one-third of the original entries.

As editor, Mr. De Voto has retained the essential flavor of the



three years of travel without burdening the reader with details of interest only to scholars. He thus makes available at a low price and in a "popular" form a record which up to now could only be found in several costly volumes.

Lewis was 29 years old and Clark was 33 at the time the expeditionary party was assembled. Both leaders had considerable experience in command and wilderness life. Interestingly enough, command appears to have been a joint responsibility with no recorded friction to mar this happy association. Lewis was the diplomat, Clark the negotiator. One complemented the other. The permanent party consisted of three sergeants serving at \$8.00 per month and 24 privates (\$5.00 per month), two interpreters (one with an Indian wife) and one negro slave (Clark's).

Only one death occurred during the whole voyage and that apparently from appendicitis.

The remarkable thing in reading this fascinating account is the matter-of-fact nature of the journal entries. The reader is often left to develop his own atmosphere of adventure from what at first glance appear to be ordinary events. Hunters will read the detailed accounts of game sightings and shootings with wistful dreams of the "good old days." Military readers conversant with the problems of traversing difficult terrain may justly admire the leadership and skill of the co-captains. Considering the tremendous difficulties which had to be overcome, the singular success of this expedition attests to the unusual quality of the men who formed it.

Reviewed by LtCol V. J. Croizat

A Treasure of Ming China...

CHINA IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: the Journal of Mathew Ricci; 1583-1610—Translated from the Latin by Louis J. Gallagher, S. J., with a forward by Richard F. Cushing, D.D., L.L.D., 616 pages, illustrated, index. New York: Random House. \$7.50

Because China of the latter 16th century dwelled in a "splendid" but deliberate isolation, students of Chinese history have had to depend almost exclusively on Chinese writers for any understanding of the high culture, government and economy of those latter years of the great Ming dynasty.

Father Mathew Ricci's "journals" fill a long-standing need for a look at Ming China through intelligent Western eyes. It is doubtful if there was any European as qualified as Mathew Ricci to report on the Chinese civilization of that era, for prior to his departure for the Jesuit's Far Eastern Mission he was recognized as one of the great European scholars. His scholarship had at least two beneficial results: It opened the way for his entrance into the com-

panionship of the literati and nobility of China, and it made possible his highly perceptive and informative observations on Chinese life before European colonialism forced a foothold on the Chinese littoral.

These journals open a door to China that Marco Polo closed when he departed for Europe three centuries earlier. The journals are actually Father Ricci's story of his 27 years in China. Written originally for the General of the Society of Jesus and not for publication, they were found in Father Ricci's desk after his death in Peking in 1610, and were sent to Rome in the care of Nicholas Trigault who translated them into Latin during the long sea voyage. Originally published by Trigault in 1616, this Random House edition is the first translation into English from Latin.

Father Ricci, who succeeded in entering the Celestial Kingdom to found the first Christian mission in China, was not only a devout and militant missionary, but he was, in addition, a brilliant scientist, a scholarly philosopher and a keen and understanding student of human nature. There have been few indeed who have equalled his understanding of the Chinese mind. This latter quality was amply demonstrated by his conclusion that there was much in common between Christian doctrine and the teachings of Confucius.

Through his scholarship the Chinese gained intellectual contact with the most advanced European scientific, geographic and philosophic thought. Ricci, among other things, translated Euclid into Chinese and wrote and published (in Chinese) dissertations on ethics that were widely acclaimed by the Chinese literati.

This book is by no means an abstract history. Much of it has application to the present situation in the Orient. As one example, Father Ricci repeatedly refers to the Chinese concern over Japanese threats against

Korea, the capture of Japanese spies in Peking, and Chinese military preparation to aid Korea in accordance with China's obligation toward a tributary state. This is particularly meaningful today as Mao Tse-Tung bends toward a policy of re-establishing China as the Middle Kingdom of Asia.

By the time of his death Father Ricci was highly esteemed by the Chinese. He had broken all precedent by being made a High Mandarin and the President of the Royal Astronomical Society. The Emperor even made an imperial grant of a burial place.

This is not only a valuable history, it is also the story of one of the truly great men of time.

Reviewed by Colonel J. D. Hittle

"Tin Can" Eulogy...

UNITED STATES DESTROYER OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II—Theodore Roscoe, 554 pages, illustrated. Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute. \$10.00

United States Destroyer Operations in World War II is the story of the steel ships and steel men of the Navy's destroyer forces. Four years of preparation have gone into the preparation of this story. It contains 300 photographs, 40 battle and area charts and over a hundred drawings and diagrams.

Beginning with a brief account of the destroyer's inception as a warship and its World War I development, the book deals with destroyer force activities in the "short-of-war" period which came as an Atlantic overture to World War II, the Pearl Harbor assault, the life-and-death Battle of the Atlantic, the last-ditch stand by the old "four-pipers" at the Malay Barrier and the race to hold the Australia-Midway-Aleutians line.

Also detailed are the parts played by destroyers in the savage engagements of the Solomons campaign and the bitter fight for the South Pacific.

There follow, in turn, the destroyer missions in North Africa, the Mediterranean, at Sicily, Salerno and Anzio, the Normandy landings and those in southern France.

Switching back to the Pacific the story turns to DesPac's effort in the drive through the Bismarck Barrier to the doorstep of the Philippines. The Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf and

Ormoc Bay battles, which put destroyers and destroyer men to the ultimate test, are recounted in detail.

The DesPac story moves with relentless pace to Saipan and the struggle at Okinawa where the destroyers fought their greatest battle



as picket boats against the deadly Kamikazes.

For Marines who have served with the Fleet and for those of the Fleet Marine Force who have been safely convoyed to the landing beaches of hostile shores by DDs and DEs, *United States Destroyer Operations in World War II* will bring back vividly the days of the "Big War." It will furnish a detailed picture of the actions of the men and ships that supported us in the great drive across the Pacific.

Reviewed by Major G. P. Averill

A Lesson in History...

TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY—Winston Churchill, 676 pages. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. \$6.00

Triumph and Tragedy by Sir Winston Churchill is the sixth and last volume of his world-famous history of World War II. And it must be admitted that a lesson in history from Mr. Churchill is as awe-inspiring and instructive to the amateur historian as a lesson in golf from Ben Hogan would be to the amateur golfer.

Mr. Churchill is especially adept in the language of military men, and possesses an amazing power to see deep into the core of both basic and highly advanced military problems. Take, for example, his magnificent word-picture to the House of Commons of the problems encountered in the planning of that huge amphibious operation, the Normandy Landings on D-Day, 6 June 1944: "... This vast operation is undoubtedly the most complicated and

difficult that has ever taken place. It involves tides, winds, waves, visibility, both from the air and sea standpoint and the combined employment of land, air and sea forces in the highest degree of intimacy and in contact with conditions which could not and cannot be fully foreseen. . . ."

Where else has any Marine seen one sentence dealing with his professional specialty in such a maximum of detail with such a minimum of words? That to me is the secret of Sir Winston's journalistic prowess and prominence—his well-trained ability to say volumes in a volume.

As he transports his readers on a magic carpet of words, we get the latest and straightest on all the phases of WWII from the Normandy landings through the dropping of the A-bombs on Japan. It is a trip any professional Marine particularly will enjoy.

Does the book have any noticeable flaws for the Marine reader? Sir Winston did manage one feat which heretofore had appeared inconceivable to this reader—that is he dealt with the Pacific war in many chapters without once mentioning the word "Marine!"

In view of the foregoing, *Caveat emptor* is definitely the word for all Marine readers who would read only of things Marine. But if they wish to read the inside story of the last phase of World War II written by an extremely well-informed and professionally-competent journalist and historian, then I would recommend unequivocally this latest of Sir Winston's masterpieces.

Reviewed by Captain W. J. Davis

Fight and Talk...

MOSCOW AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS—Robert Carver North, 306 pages, annotated and indexed. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. \$5.00

Old China hands who believe that Chinese Communists are "really just Nationalists" or just people looking for a belly-full of rice are in for a rude awakening according to Robert Carver North. *Moscow and Chinese Communists* cuts through the smoke screen of contradictory actions and headlines to prove that Comintern agents infiltrated Chinese intellectual, union and peasant groups alike as early as 1920.

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In fact, Red agents helped Sun Yat-sen write the Chinese constitution, establish governmental bureaus and organize the military academy, which a young soldier named Chiang Kai-shek headed.

In explaining this "exceedingly controversial aspect of Bolshevik theory and practice" the author dispels the misconception that the Chinese Communists can be stopped by dropping a few bombs, putting embargoes into effect or arming Chiang.

In addition, this book illustrates how vaguely-worded instructions from Moscow enabled "the Kremlin to disclaim all responsibility for errors (of which there were many) . . . or to assume full credit for success."

The Nationalists' defeat in China, despite three-to-one odds, is blamed on poor leaders, unsound tactics and strategy, hesitation by Chiang to undertake necessary reforms to eliminate corruption and mal-administration, and finally the Western inability to comprehend or keep up with the dynamics of the Chinese revolution.

And where do we go from here? Mr. North warns we must expect the Chinese Reds to "fight and talk, talk and fight"—to keep the cold war and peace-delaying talks going and to fight only when they think the enemy will retreat, allowing them to advance without fear of an all-out war.

In conclusion, he presents his outline of a co-operative plan for Western and Asian powers to outwit Communist strategy: a series of transitional programs for the step-by-step transformation of remaining colonial areas into independent republics—to "liberate from ignorance, poverty and fear and to undercut the Communist appeal in Asia and Africa and promote peace, order and progress everywhere."

Although the author emphasizes that gathering material for *Moscow and Chinese Communists* was like "probing about in a black and seemingly bottomless pit," he has, nevertheless, wielded a sharp scalpel in his explorations. His critical analysis of documents captured in raids on Soviet diplomatic premises and sifting of material at the Hoover Library at Stanford University have produced the first full-length, inside

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
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story of the Communist conquest of China.

It isn't a book designed for an evening of light reading, but Mr. North's ability as a novelist (he wrote *Revolt in San Marcos*) does prevent it from being a dull tome.

Reviewed by Major Thomas J. Saxon

Outlook on Korea . . .

SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY — John Dille, 219 pages. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc. \$3.00

Substitute for Victory answers many of the questions that are, or have been, in the minds of the Americans fighting in Korea. Mr. Dille makes it clear in the first chapter the purpose of the book . . . "—the reason for this book: it is a personal interpretation of the war, as it added up to me, and I submit it with the sincere hope that perhaps it will allow its readers . . . and especially the men who fought in Korea . . . to feel a little better about the War. They deserve it."

Mr. Dille points out or brings forth the impact of the different commanders' personalities. It can be said he soundly, though subtly, thumps MacArthur for his conduct of the Korean war. Later, he has

another crack at General MacArthur for certain aspects of the Japanese occupation.

Ridgway is given credit for welding a demoralized 8th Army once again into a fighting organization. This certainly can be concurred in by all hands who were in Korea at that time. Van Fleet is described as a "solid and plodding" type general, while Ridgway is described as "flashy and dramatic."

A military man often wonders what the local population thinks of him. For those of you who were in Korea, Mr. Dille tells us what the Koreans think of Americans, and in some cases it isn't very complimentary.

Mr. Dille was favorably impressed by what he saw on Formosa and writes very optimistically about Chiang and his new forces.

The democracy that we have founded in Japan is analyzed by the author. His viewpoints are interesting, especially those on the farm program. One gets the feeling that the democracy we have created in the East is in for a long, hard struggle.

All in all, *Substitute for Victory* is refreshing reading. Many of the

points about which Mr. Dille writes are extremely controversial. Nevertheless, he presents them in a very optimistic manner. It's good to read a book that looks on the sunny side of the street for a change.

Reviewed by LtCol N. A. Miller, Jr.

Human Torpedoes . . .

THE MIDGET RAIDERS — C. E. T. Warren and James Benson, 318 pages, illustrated. New York: William Sloane Associates, Publishers. \$4.50

Even the U. S. Navy's underwater demolition teams would be hard put to match the excitement experienced by England's midget submariners — charioteers, as the human torpedo men were called.

Typically though, many months of grueling training, repairing and modifying must be compared with the few fruitful hours of a successful midget sub or chariot attack.

Warren and Benson have produced an excellent documentary of the inception, development and perfection of these small craft and the recruiting and training of the men and officers who manned them. The co-authors have combined their writing skills and detailed knowledge of the subject to produce a book that is a must for every naval library and one that is pleasant reading, packed with unusual adventure.

These underwater midgets surprised the British Navy by growing into a major force in the conduct of the war. They did many tasks well. From reconnoitering the beach prior to the invasion of Sicily to immobilizing the battleship *Tirpitz*; from sinking cruisers in North Africa to cutting transoceanic cables in the Far East; from damaging floating dry docks in Norway to guiding landing craft into Normandy Beach, these midgets won the admiration of their blue-jacketed counterparts in other arms of the Navy.

Admiral Sir Max K. Horton was a supporter of the small-sub idea from the pre-1914 era. Summing up midget submarine and human torpedo activity for World War II, Sir Max, with typical British restraint, praised their accomplishments at great length and then remarked, "One can only say: Well done!" Most readers of this book will praise these men and their unusual machines much more profusely.

Reviewed by Major D. D. Nicholson, Jr.

Jos. A.


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Books on Parade

Korean Tales. *Melvin B. Voorhees.* LtCol, U. S. Army. This book is packed with outspoken and revealing chapters on what are admittedly fiercely controversial subjects. It presents a first-hand account of the spirit, the problems, the accomplishments, the personalities and the very atmosphere that has surrounded EUSAK since the outbreak of fighting in Korea. **\$3.00**

Von Rundstedt, The Soldier And The Man. *Guenther Blumentritt.* A vivid study of Von Rundstedt's personal history done by his chief of staff. Remarkable in concept and enthralling in detail, it is a fine assessment of the events which contributed to the defeat of Germany. **\$3.50**

The Blue Hussar. *Roger Nimier.* An 18-year-old joins the French Resistance Movement in 1940 and later becomes involved in counter-organizations. It might well be called the French version of *From Here To Eternity*. **\$3.75**

On War. *Karl Von Clausewitz.* Accepted internationally as the classic study on the philosophy and strategy of war. This is the first complete and unabridged modern translation. **\$3.50**

The Nightingales Are Singing. *Monica Dickens.* An inside view of social life in Washington as seen by the wife of a naval officer. **\$3.75**

La Fiesta Brava. *Barnaby Conrad.* The text describes in fascinatingly human terms the history and the personalities surrounding the science of bullfighting, as well as all the methods, techniques and behind-the-scenes details. **\$5.00**

From Here To Eternity. *James Jones.* Two men in continual conflict who have a common bond. The story of two Army 30-year men and their loves, hates and roisterings in a pre-war Honolulu. **\$2.69**

War Through The Ages. *Lynn Montross.* From spears to the atom-bomb, this is a concise and vivid account of warfare from the earliest times, told in terms of the people who fought and the great conquerors who led them. **\$7.50**

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